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ABSTRACT
Pillars of U.S. social provision, public pension funds rely
significantly on private investment to meet their chronically
underfunded promises to America’s workers. Dependent on
investment returns, pension funds are increasingly investing in
marginalized debt, namely the array of high-interest-rate, subprime,
risky debt—including small-dollar installment loans and other forms
of subprime debt—that tends to concentrate in and among historically
marginalized communities, often to catastrophic effect. Marginalized
debt is a valuable investment because its characteristically high interest
rates and myriad fees engender higher returns. In turn, higher returns
ostensibly mean greater retirement security for ordinary workers who
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are themselves economically vulnerable in the current atmosphere of
public welfare retrenchment. They must increasingly fend for
themselves if they hope to retire at a decent age and with dignity, if at
all.
This Article surfaces this debt-centered relational connection
between two socio-economically vulnerable groups: retirementinsecure workers and marginalized borrowers. It argues that in the
hands of private financial intermediaries, whose fiduciary duties and
profit-sensitive incentives eschew broader moral considerations of the
source of profits or the social consequences of regressive wealth
extraction, depends openly on the tenuous socioeconomic condition of
one community as a source of wealth accumulation for another
vulnerable community. Consequently, it argues tha the incursion of
private entities into the arena of public welfare is pernicious because it
commodifies and reinforces the subordinate socioeconomic conditions
on which marginalized debt thrives.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................ 775
I. Feeding on Marginalized Debt.......................................................... 783
A. Pension Fund Investment in Pre-Great Recession
Marginalized Debt ............................................................... 787
B. Pension Fund Investment in Post-Great Recession
Marginalized Debt ............................................................... 790
1. A Primer on Private Equity Funds ................................. 791
2. Private Equity and “Subprime Higher Education” ....... 793
3. Expanded Private Equity Investment in
Marginalized Debt ................................................................ 794
II. Retirement Insecurity in the Self-Help Welfare State.................. 798
A. A Brief History of Employment Pensions in the U.S. ..... 799
B. Shifting the Risk of Retirement Security .......................... 804
1. Shifting Retirement Risk from Employers
to Employees ......................................................................... 804
2. Public Pensions and Risk................................................. 810
C. Delegating Retirement Security to Financialized
Markets .................................................................................. 814
III. Commodifying Marginalization ..................................................... 817
A. Accumulating Wealth from “Debt-Power” ...................... 818
B. Incentivizing Marginalization ............................................. 820
C. Pitting Borrowers Against Workers................................... 822

ATKINSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

12/17/2021 4:06 PM

COMMODIFYING MARGINALIZATION

775

IV. On Addressing Marginalization as Value ..................................... 827
A. Regulatory Reform and Harm Reduction ........................ 828
1. Expanding the Fiduciary Duties of Public
Pension Funds ....................................................................... 829
2. Regulating Private Equity Funds .................................... 835
B. On Marginalization, Debt, and Value ............................... 839
1. On the Historical Value of Marginalization ................... 839
2. On the Continued Value of Marginalization.................. 842
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 844
“[O]ne day we must come to see that an edifice which produces
beggars needs restructuring.”
- Martin Luther King, Jr., 19671

INTRODUCTION
The ability to borrow money is an important aspect of the U.S.
public-private welfare regime.2 Indeed, “credit/debt”3 lies at the center
of social provision policy for low-income individuals in the U.S.4 and
for other socially-marginalized groups, like women and African
Americans.5 This credit deployed as social provision, however, often
comes in the form of “marginalized debt,” the array of high-interestrate, subprime, risky debt that tends to concentrate in and among
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address Delivered at the Eleventh Annual Southern Christian
Leadership Conference Convention, Atlanta, GA: Where Do We Go From Here? (Aug. 16,
1967), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/where-do-we-go-here-addressdelivered-eleventh-annual-sclc-convention [https://perma.cc/5ZT4-X6LN].
2. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12 (2002) [hereinafter HACKER,
DIVIDED]. Political scientist Jacob Hacker defines the public-private welfare regime as a
combination of: (1) “direct pension social programs” like Social Security; (2) “the constellation
of more indirect or ‘hidden’ government interventions,” like tax breaks and government
subsidies, “that are designed to provide similar social benefits or shape their private provision”;
and (3) “publicly-regulated and subsidized private benefits.” Id.
3. Gustav Peebles, The Anthropology of Credit and Debt, 39 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY
225, 226 (2010) (noting that “credit and debt stand as an inseparable, dyadic unit,” and adopting
the term “credit/debt” because “debt is always already a dyadic relation that requires its
opposite[, credit]”).
4. Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1108–12
(2019) [hereinafter Atkinson, Rethinking] (describing debates about how to regulate the cost of
payday loans).
5. Abbye Atkinson, Borrowing Equality, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1419–24 (2020)
[hereinafter Atkinson, Borrowing] (describing 1960s and 1970s advocacy for increased access to
credit as a means of greater socioeconomic equality for women and African Americans).
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historically marginalized communities.6 Even so, social provision
policies have conceived of credit/debt as an institution that, when fairly
priced, can smooth consumption and serve as a catalyst for social
mobility for marginalized borrowers.7
Marginalized borrowers, however, are not the only ones for whom
social welfare policy invokes the power of credit/debt as a valid means
of social provision. Social provision policy has also conceived of
credit/debt as a valid means of wealth extraction in service of increased
retirement security for workers. Specifically, public pension funds—
which rely heavily on investment returns to meet their obligations to
retirees8—have increasingly moved their gargantuan pools of “labor’s
capital”9 into alternative investments, like marginalized debt, that
promise higher yields crucial to fund pension obligations even as they
portend greater risk of loss.10
Consequently, marginalized debt is increasingly an asset that
rounds out the diversified portfolios of the nation’s public pension
funds. In this context, marginalized debt serves as a mechanism of
social welfare because it furnishes a basis from which working people

6. E.g., Taz George, Robin Neuberger & Mark O’Dell, The Geography of Subprime Credit,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF CHI. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/profitwisenews-and-views/2019/the-georgraphy-of-subprime-credit [https://perma.cc/3R4L-U4BP].
7. Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 1097.
8. E.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STATE PENSION FUNDS REDUCE RATES OF RETURN
5 (2019) [hereinafter PEW REPORT], https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/01/
state_public_pension_funds_lower_assumed_rates_of_returns_final_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UXW5-CJB3] (observing that “[i]nvestment returns make up more than 60 percent of public
pension plan revenues [while] employer and employee contributions make up the rest”).
9. E.g., DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S
LAST BEST WEAPON 8 (2018) (defining “labor’s capital” as “the trillions of dollars held in public
pension funds”); TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 50 (1992) (observing that “[p]ensions may not be labor’s wages, but labor’s
capital” in part because they function “as an insurance fund in which every [worker] holds a
share”).
10. Ben Christopher, Riskier Bet: Why CalPERS, the Country’s Largest Pension Fund, Is
Getting into Banking, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (July 9, 2020, 10:48 PM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2020/07/09/why-calpers-the-countrys-largest-pension-fund-isgetting-into-banking [https://perma.cc/LLH8-9QAK] (observing that in the search for investment
returns, “pensions [have] ventured further into the Wild West of ‘alternative investments’ —
private equity, one-off infrastructure projects and real estate[, with e]ach step t[aking] the funds
into potentially more profitable, but also more perilous, terrain”); see also GORDON L. CLARK,
PENSION FUND CAPITALISM 28 (2000) (observing “the rise of pension fund capitalism and the
world of finance with which it is intimately associated”); DAVID F. SWENSEN, PIONEERING
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT 55 (2009) (noting that “[f]inance theory posits that acceptance of greater risk leads
to the reward of higher expected returns”).
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might, at least nominally, shore up their often-precarious retirement
prospects.11 Yet, in this iteration of credit/debt as social provision, it is
the investor-pensioners who ostensibly benefit from the borrowing, not
the borrowers themselves.
For example, the Kentucky Retirement Systems (“KRS”) is a
public pension fund that has served the state’s public employees,
including Kentucky’s teachers and police officers, since its inception in
1956.12 KRS is currently significantly underfunded.13 Like most public
pension funds,14 KRS depends heavily on investment in private

11. E.g., Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2013)
(observing that “many public pension plans are seriously underfunded either intentionally or due
to unrealistic assumptions concerning investment performance and the amount that will be owed
over time,” and that one of the worries of the public pension crisis is the potential “consequences
to public employees and retirees, especially those who did not participate in Social Security, who
could be left with insufficient assets for a decent retirement”); David H. Webber, The Use and
Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2108–09 (2014) (observing that “pension
reductions . . . can be particularly damaging to public employees because millions of them,
including . . . forty percent of public school teachers across the country, and two-thirds of all
public-safety employees, are ineligible for Social Security because of their public pensions,” and
that “[t]hose pensions are often all they have to sustain them in retirement”). But see Susan
Soederberg, Cannibalistic Capitalism: The Paradoxes of Neoliberal Pension Securitization, in THE
CRISIS THIS TIME 224, 224 (Leo Panitch, Greg Albo & Vivek Chibber eds., 2010) (defining this
process as “cannibalistic capitalism” because it “captures the processes by which workers’ savings
in the form of pension funds feed off both their own increased indebtedness and that of other
workers, a condition driven largely by stagnant real wages and unemployment”).
12. About KPPA, KY. RET. SYS., https://kyret.ky.gov/About/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MV7N-B5L8].
13. E.g., Alicia McElhaney, Following a Tumultuous 2020, Kentucky Retirement Systems
Hires
New
Investment
Head,
INSTITUTIONAL
INV.
(Jan.
7,
2021),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1q0rg702mvcps/Following-a-Tumultuous-2020Kentucky-Retirement-Systems-Hires-New-Investment-Head [https://perma.cc/UY6N-DUQ5]
(observing that “KRS continues to struggle with its funded status, according to its comprehensive
annual financial report for the year ending June 30”). For context, a pension plan is sufficiently
funded “if the plan has sufficient assets to meet its emerging benefit obligations in a timely
fashion, given reasonable assumptions about future contributions and investment income.”
Jonathan Barry Forman, Fully Funded Pensions, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1205, 1231 (2020). Thus,
according to one local observer, “KRS is one of the nation’s worst-funded public pensions
systems, with more than $25 billion in unfunded pension liabilities, due primarily to the failures
of state leaders over two decades.” John Cheves, ‘A Cloud Hanging Over All of Us.’ NKU Plans
To Exit Kentucky’s State Pension System, LEXINGTON HERALD LEDGER (Dec. 14, 2020, 12:18
PM), https://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/article247828680.html [https://
perma.cc/K6RW-LZNF]; see also Elizabeth S. Goldman & Stewart E. Sterk, The Impact of Law
on the State Pension Crisis, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 106 (2019) (“At the close of the 2016
fiscal year, Kentucky’s primary pension plan for civilian state employees was only 16% funded.”).
14. PEW REPORT, supra note 8 (observing that “[i]nvestment returns make up more than 60
percent of public pension plan revenues [while] employer and employee contributions make up
the rest”); see also CalPERS, How Is Your CalPERS Pension Funded?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 25, 2020)
[hereinafter
CalPERS
Video],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bl-7HZsChU8
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markets to meet its goals.15 Its investment holdings are numerous and
diversified, including a mix of low-risk, low-yield investments and highrisk alternative investments.16 As to the latter, as of September 2020,
KRS invests significantly in marginalized debt, including in subprime
lenders like Flagship Credit Auto,17 Freedom Mortgage Corporation,18
and Santander Consumer Bank USA, an auto lender well-known for
its predatory auto loans.19 Thus, as KRS struggles to right itself, it does
so, at least in part, on the backs of marginalized borrowers who find
themselves prey to predatory subprime lenders like Santander.20

[https://perma.cc/F2XK-RSWA] (“If you were to break down each dollar we pay in pension
benefits it looks like this: 13 cents comes [sic] from CalPERS members, 29 cents comes [sic]
CalPERS employers, and 58 cents comes [sic] from what we earn on the money we invest.”).
15. See generally KY. RET. SYS., INTERNAL ASSET HOLDINGS REPORT (2020) [hereinafter
INTERNAL ASSET HOLDINGS REPORT], https://kyret.ky.gov/Investments/Investments%
20Holdings/KTYALL%20Holdings%20as%20of%2031%20September%202020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J8W6-XR4R] (listing KRS’s investments as of September 2021).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 132; Our Services, FLAGSHIP CREDIT, https://www.flagshipcredit.com/our-services
[https://perma.cc/4MR3-BDPH]. By its own account, “Flagship’s programs are designed to serve
customers who have limited access to automobile financing through traditional lending sources.
Many of our customers have experienced prior credit difficulties or have limited credit histories
and generally have FICO® scores ranging from 500 to 675.” Id.
18. INTERNAL ASSET HOLDINGS REPORT, supra note 15, at 140; About Freedom Mortgage
Corporation,
FREEDOM
MORTG.
CORP.,
https://www.freedommortgage.com/about
[https://perma.cc/65QQ-TWS2]. In similar tones, Freedom Mortgage Corporation writes that:
“[O]ur mission is to foster homeownership across the United States. . . . We specialize in
mortgages that can help you buy or refinance a home regardless of your unique circumstances.
We are particularly focused on helping our service members realize the American dream of
homeownership.” Id.
19. INTERNAL ASSET HOLDINGS REPORT, supra note 15, at 174; Auto Financing,
SANTANDER
CONSUMER
USA
[hereinafter
Auto
Financing,
SANTANDER],
https://santanderconsumerusa.com/auto-financing [https://perma.cc/7Y4B-35V5] (purporting to
“[h]elp[] drivers reach their destinations, regardless of credit”). Santander is no stranger to
regulatory sanction for questionable behavior. For example, as recently as December 2020, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fined Santander Consumer $4.7 million for fair lending
violations. Laura Alix, CFPB Fines Santander Consumer $4.7M for Fair-Lending Violations, AM.
BANKER (Dec. 22, 2020, 5:52 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-fines-santanderconsumer-4-7m-for-fair-lending-violations [https://perma.cc/WYD4-U3MP]. It has previously
been sanctioned for predatory behavior. E.g., David Shepardson, Santander Agrees to $550
Million U.S. Settlement Over Subprime Auto Loans, REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 12:21 PM),
https://reut.rs/2LJgN8I [https://perma.cc/3R7R-U87L].
20. In a recently posted Holdings Statement from September 2020, KRS lists each of these
companies among its fixed asset investments. INTERNAL ASSET HOLDINGS REPORT, supra note
15, at 174; see also Patrick Rucker, CFPB Fines Spain’s Santander $11.8 Million Over Misleading
Loans, Insurance, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://reut.rs/2FHQsrM
[https://perma.cc/EM3Q-HXNZ] (“Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc SC.N, a leading
subprime auto lender, will pay $11.8 million to settle claims that it misled customers about the
cost and terms of auto loans and insurance . . . .”).
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As exemplified by KRS, the rise of marginalized debt reveals the
advance of debt-focused privatization in social welfare policy in two
particular aspects. First, it shows how the current public-private
welfare regime has largely shifted retirement security into the hands of
private financial actors, whose fiduciary duties and profit-sensitive
incentives eschew broader moral considerations of the externalities of
retiree wealth maximization.21 Second, the rise of marginalized debt as
a source of retiree wealth maximization shows how in the financialized
economy, the tenuous socioeconomic condition of one community22 is
now openly a source of wealth accumulation for retirement-insecure
workers, another vulnerable community.23 To that end, credit/debt
reveals itself both (1) as a politically expedient and versatile means of
financing a decent standard of living for low-income and other
economically-vulnerable groups, without the burden of solving for
“persistent wage stagnation and other entrenched social
pathologies,”24 and (2) as a politically expedient means of financing a
decent standard of living for older people, without the burden of
solving for the real failures of retirement security, like overpromising.25
The Great Recession of 2008 illustrated the facets of this modern,
financialized, and marginalized-debt-infused retirement system.
Before the economic crisis gripped the global economy, marginalized
debt that was in the form of subprime mortgages was a valuable,
though ultimately volatile, commodity for a range of institutional
21. WEBBER, supra note 9, at 9.
22. E.g., Peter Whoriskey, ‘A Way of Monetizing Poor People’: How Private Equity Firms
Make Money Offering Loans to Cash-Strapped Americans, WASH. POST (July 1, 2018, 7:23 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-way-of-monetizing-poor-people-how-private
-equity-firms-make-money-offering-loans-to-cash-strapped-americans/2018/07/01/5f7e2670-5dee11e8-9ee3-49d6d4814c4c_story.html [https://perma.cc/SC3N-ULAC] (“Private equity firms, with
billions to invest, have taken significant stakes in the growing [small-dollar installment loan]
field.”).
23. E.g., WEBBER, supra note 9 (observing that for many employees with public pensions,
the “loss of their jobs and pensions would leave them on the knife’s edge of poverty, if not
impoverished”).
24. Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 1101.
25. G. Alan Tarr, No Exit: The Financial Crisis Facing State Courts, 100 KY. L.J. 785, 803
(2012) (“Some states have in the past balanced their budgets in part by inducing public employee
unions to accept lower wage increases with the promise of future benefits payments, and the
effects of this short-term gimmick are now being felt.”). Jack Beermann argues that “[u]nfunded
pension promises benefit politicians” by “allow[ing] for current officials to provide services
without requiring taxpayers to pay for them until much later, when they may be out of office.”
Beermann, supra note 11, at 27. “Second, pension promises help politicians shore up support
among government workers, or at least avoid opposition from government workers, which would
be substantial if significant reductions in pension benefits were proposed.” Id.
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investors including pension funds,26 notwithstanding its broader
destructive effects on the communities targeted for such marginalized
debt.27 With its characteristically elevated interest rates, subprime
mortgages specifically attracted pension funds that were interested in
the accelerated accumulation of assets.28 Familiarly, when the bubble
burst, both retirees and marginalized communities were devastated by
the subprime mortgage crisis that spawned the global Great
Recession.29
Nevertheless, more than a decade after the debacle of the Great
Recession, marginalized debt continues to draw the interest of pension
funds trying to supplement their more stable, long-term returns with
the higher returns that such risky investment promises.30
Notwithstanding the tough lessons of the subprime mortgage crisis,
pension fund managers remain willing to gamble for high returns by
filling out pension fund portfolios with various forms of marginalized
debt. This approach includes investment in private equity funds that
target marginalized-debt-based businesses like for-profit education31
and subprime small-dollar installment lenders.32
In this light, this Article makes both a descriptive and normative
contribution. Descriptively, it surfaces the phenomenon of public
pension investment in marginalized debt as a source of retirement
security. It shows how the U.S. public-private welfare regime has
driven ordinary workers, through their representatives, to secure their
retirement wellbeing on the backs of vulnerable borrowers’ use of
marginalized debt. More broadly, it highlights how marginalized debt
26. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (“Institutional investment vehicles
generally are grouped in five categories: foundations and endowments, bank (non-pension) trusts,
insurance companies, investment companies, and private and public pension funds.”).
27. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 204 (2011).
28. See id.
29. E.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen Eilers Lahey, Reforming Public
Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11 (2014) (“Pension reform has taken center stage in the
public policy debate as states struggle to deal with the fallout from the Great Recession.”);
Tarr, supra note 25 (noting that following the Great Recession, “state pension obligations have
been tied to stock market investments, and the decline in stock prices has meant that these
obligations are significantly underfunded”).
30. See, e.g., James Estes & Janine Kremling, Public Pension Issues and an Examination of
CalPERS, the Largest of the Nation’s Public Pension Programs, 72 J. FIN. SERV. PROS. 74, 76
(2018).
31. See infra Part I.B.2.
32. See infra Part I.B.3.
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has become central in the late-capitalist framework as a means of
wealth accumulation. This characterization of marginalized debt is
distinctly different, however, from the existing academic and policy
discussions on the value of marginalized debt. The latter tend to focus
merely on internal considerations like non-discriminatory pricing33 or
credit/debt’s ability to engender social mobility,34 without reference to
the broader instrumentality of this credit/debt in the economy.
Normatively, it argues that this drift into market-based, debtfunded social provision is wrong because it commodifies the condition
of socioeconomic marginalization. This is because the value of
investing in this kind of debt depends entirely on a steady pool of
marginalized borrowers who consistently have to pay more in interest
rates and fees in order to borrow. In other words, retirement
investment in marginalized debt capitalizes on the persistence of
socioeconomic inequality. Given the significance of pensions and,
more particularly, public pensions to ordinary workers, including those
from historically marginalized groups, this reliance incentivizes and
even perversely justifies continued inequality and marginalization.35 At
a minimum, in light of their broader significance and public purpose,
public pension funds should not participate in this form of regressive
investment for moral reasons, at a minimum. Yet, as immersed as
public pension funds now are in privatized, market-based investment,
it is unsurprising that they too would reflect an enduring aspect of U.S.
capitalism: embracing marginalization as a valid source of wealth
extraction.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the incidence of
the institutional investment of pensions in marginalized debt, both preand post-Great Recession. It shows how, for pension funds as big
33.
34.
35.

See, e.g., Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 1155.
See, e.g., id., at 1440.
See, e.g., ROBERT HILTONSMITH, DEMOS, TWIN THREATS: HOW DISAPPEARING
PUBLIC PENSIONS HURT BLACK WORKERS, 1–2 (2016), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/
files/publications/Twin%20Threats%20-%20How%20Disappearing%20Public%20Pensions%
20Hurt%20Black%20Workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BMZ-UDQ2] (arguing that “[d]espite
decades of efforts to reduce employment discrimination in the private sector, public employment
remains important to African American workers as a source of income security, helping to close
the wage gap” and that “[a]s important as public employment is to the black middle class, the
pensions provided by public employment are perhaps even more crucial to the retirement security
of black workers”); cf. Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three
Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 39 (2009) (noting that “the politically loaded
quality” of categories like race and gender “is obscured by a thick layer of justifying ideology . . .
that serve[s] to make [their] existing social practices and relations seem natural, normal, and
necessary”).
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institutional investors, marginalized debt bears significant instrumental
value as a means of retiree wealth maximization. Part II contextualizes
this phenomenon in the increasing privatization of retirement security
in the U.S. public-private welfare regime. It describes two significant
pressures on retirement security that have pushed public pension plans
and future retirees more broadly into the “Wild West” of financial
markets.36 First, it explains the shifting burden and risk of pension
funding from employers to workers. Second, it shows how the burden
and risk of adequate retirement funding have caused retirement funds
to depend significantly on investment in the private financial markets,
including investment in marginalized debt.
Part III argues that we should worry about public pension funding
that relies on marginalized debt for profits because it, along with other
institutional investment, commodifies and incentivizes the persistence
of marginalization more generally. Indeed, marginalized debt as an
investment strategy is dependent on a steady supply of borrowers
whose life conditions relegate them to payday loans, small-dollar
installment loans, student loans to attend for-profit colleges, and the
like. Consequently, from the investor’s perspective, the value of a
marginalized-debt investment derives from the proposition that there
will be a reliably steady stream of people in society who are relegated
to risky debt because of their subordinate socioeconomic status and
conditions. In the case of public pension funds, this profit motivation is
inconsistent with their public-oriented social welfare purpose.
Part IV considers the plausibility of regulatory reform as a
resolution to the problems engendered by public pension fund
investment in marginalized debt. It examines both whether pension
funds as pillars of social welfare should have a more public-regarding
mission that precludes this sort of extractive investment in
marginalization, and whether the undue influence of financial
intermediaries on such an important aspect of social provision should
justify closer scrutiny and regulation of their involvement in
transactions that have such close impact on the public interest. It
concludes that, although increased regulation of these sectors would
provide some measure of harm-reduction,37 more regulation would
36. Christopher, supra note 10.
37. See Robert J. MacCoun, Moral Outrage and Opposition to Harm Reduction, 7 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 83, 85, 95 (2013) (defining harm reduction as “making an objectionable behavior safer,”
and observing that a harm reduction policy “take[s] for granted that people will engage in the
[harmful] behavior” and consequently takes “steps . . . to make it less risky”). For example, a
needle exchange program is a harm reductive policy aimed at addressing heroin use. Id. at 92.
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nevertheless skirt the larger, structural problems that engender this
pitting of one vulnerable group against another in the name of wealth
extraction. It posits that debt-based regressive wealth extraction is
merely “a shadow cast by”38 our U.S. capitalist approach to welfare that
includes reliance on the market, such as it is, to “do the choosing” in
the difficult task of redistribution.39 The market is ill-equipped to
perform this function, however, as long as wealth maximization—
independent of the social consequences of sourcing wealth for
extraction within vulnerable communities—remains a guiding
principle. Instead, it leaves financial intermediaries tasked with
securing the welfare of ordinary individuals free to commodify and
profit from the distress of others.40
I. FEEDING ON MARGINALIZED DEBT
Pension funds, alternatively known as “labor’s capital,” are an
important aspect of the U.S. public-private welfare regime.41 They are
tasked with securing the retirement income of workers and their
beneficiaries.42 Maintaining sufficient assets to meet this tremendous
burden, however, is a perennial challenge for pension funds, rendering
the investment returns from employer and employee contributions
absolutely crucial.43 For example, public pension systems rely on
investment returns to fund sixty cents of every dollar promised to

MacCoun reports that support for harm reduction as a policy approach varies across the political
spectrum and hypothesizes that this may depend on the “‘sacred’ domains where the cold calculus
of harm reduction . . . is unpalatable.” Id. at 95.
38. Martin Luther King Jr., Sermon Delivered at the Detroit Council of Churches’ Noon
Lenten Services: The Man Who Was a Fool (Mar. 6, 1961) [hereinafter King Sermon],
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/man-who-was-fool-sermon-delivereddetroit-council-churches-noon-lenten [https://perma.cc/7LJF-DS84].
39. See GRETA M. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE
RISE OF FINANCE 59 (2011). Economic sociologist Greta Krippner argues that the deregulation
of credit in the wake of 1970s economic upheaval offered an expedient, if short-term, solution for
policymakers plagued by the likely political consequences of having to determine “the rational
distribution of scarce capital between sectors.” Id.
40. Rachel E. Dwyer, Credit, Debt, and Inequality, 44 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 237, 247 (2016).
41. E.g., HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 72 (noting the “centrality” of retirement
pensions “to modern social policy”).
42. Paul Rose, Public Wealth Maximization: A New Framework for Fiduciary Duties in
Public Funds, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 891, 892.
43. Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use
Bankruptcy To Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 365, 375 (2011)
(describing the taxpayer liability for unfunded pension obligations and that, as a consequence,
municipalities invest heavily).
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pensioners.44 The necessity for sufficient returns is particularly
heightened in the public pension context where fiscally-vulnerable
states and municipalities struggle to keep up with the promises of
retirement income made to their employees, whose life expectancy
keeps rising.45
When Detroit filed for bankruptcy, its overwhelming pension
liabilities were front and center.46 In addition to other structural
problems that affected its financial health, at the time of its 2013
bankruptcy filing, Detroit’s underfunded public pensions accounted
for a significant portion of Detroit’s debt.47 The city emerged
successfully from bankruptcy following the implementation of the socalled “Grand Bargain”—a multiparty deal in which pension holders
agreed to a plan of reorganization that cut their benefits.48 The Grand
44. PEW REPORT, supra note 8; see also CalPERS Video, supra note 14.
45. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 43, at 366. Ellman and Merrett observe that “[f]aced
with unsustainable and deepening budgetary shortfalls, municipalities are being forced to
consider every option to extricate themselves from their difficult financial positions,” id.(footnote
omitted), and that “perhaps the single largest problem facing municipalities today is the dramatic
and growing shortfall in public pension funds,” id. at 367.
46. Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 3 (observing that “municipalities have looked to Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code as a means to adjust their pension obligations” and that “the City of
Detroit’s bankruptcy filing has brought this issue to the forefront”); Christine Sgarlata Chung,
Zombieland / the Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and
Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They Are Killing Cities like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 771, 818 (2014) (describing “[p]ension impairment []as . . . a hot button issue in the
Detroit bankruptcy”). Other notable municipal bankruptcies have reflected the immense
financial burdens that pension obligations place on the public purse. E.g., C. Scott Pryor,
Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less Is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85, 85 (2014)
(observing that “[t]he recent narrative of municipal bankruptcies focuses on the power of
insolvent cities to reduce burdensome retiree benefit obligations,” and that “[f]rom Orange
County to the cities of San Bernardino and Vallejo as well as Detroit, a principal focus has been
the power of cities to cut retirement benefits free of the procedural and substantive roadblocks
faced by non-municipal debtors”); Hannah Heck, Comment, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions:
The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 89, 89 (2011)
(describing Prichard, Alabama’s pension liability-motivated municipal bankruptcy filing); Chris
Megerian & Melody Petersen, Stockton Bankruptcy Ruling a Blow to Pensions, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
1, 2014, 11:59 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-stockton-bankruptcy-20141002story.html [https://perma.cc/3K86-W95Q] (describing the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the City
of Stockton, California could reduce pension obligations in its bankruptcy filing).
47. Chang, supra note 46, at 782–85. Of its then-approximately 18 billion dollar debt, Detroit
listed 6.4 billion dollars “in other post-employment benefits” and 3.5 billion “in underfunded
pension liabilities based on [then-]current actuarial estimates.” Id. at 776 (citation omitted).
48. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33
YALE J. ON REGUL. 55, 71 (2016) (describing the Grand Bargain which “reduced the [expected]
cuts to pensions for public workers and retirees” (footnote omitted)); see also Dawson, supra note
46, at 18 (describing “the two most controversial aspects of the [Detroit bankruptcy proceedings]”
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Bargain was “nothing short of miraculous,” given the complexities of
Detroit’s fiscal distress and the competing claims upon the city’s
limited funds.49 Nevertheless, Detroit’s bankruptcy has become a
cautionary tale for public pension fund managers. Indeed, by one
account, “the real lesson” from Detroit was that municipalities could
not address their broader problems in funding by shortchanging their
longer-term obligations to pensioners.50
In this regard, pension fund managers are expected to engage in
modern-day acts of veritable alchemy, taking an existing pool of
employer and employee contributions, namely labor’s capital, and
increasing its quantity in order to maximize participant wealth.51
Maximizing investment returns is crucial to success. Yet in performing
this duty, pension fund managers are at least nominally hemmed in by
their fiduciary duty to “plan participants and their beneficiaries.”52 This
duty is rooted in the tenets of trust doctrine in which trustees, in the
management of trust assets, are required to act with prudence, due
care, and “solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”53

as being “the treatment of pensioners and the treatment of Detroit’s world-class art collection at
the Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA)”); Goldman & Sterk, supra note 13, at 108 (“At the municipal
level, pension default has already become a reality: Detroit’s bankruptcy resulted in a cut in
pension benefits promised to retired workers.” (footnote omitted)); Lester Graham, Detroit
Bankruptcy Lesson: Underfunded Pension Funds Could Trip Up Other Municipalities, MICH.
WATCH (Dec. 1, 2015, 6:08 AM), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/detroit-bankruptcy-lessonunderfunded-pension-funds-could-trip-other-municipalities [https://perma.cc/F53V-DH2Q] (“If
the city’s retirees had not agreed to cuts and had the so-called ‘Grand Bargain’ not minimized
those cuts, the city’s bankruptcy could still be in the courts.”).
49. Jacoby, supra note 48, at 56; see also Graham, supra note 48 (opining that the Grand
Bargain “is not a feat that other cities facing bankruptcy are likely to pull off”).
50. Graham, supra note 48 (“Shorting the pension fund is kicking the can down a road that
leads to financial disaster.”); see also Jun Peng, Public Pension Funds and Operating Budgets: A
Tale of Three States, 24 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 59, 61–62 (2004) (“[A] chronic underfunding of
public pension plans in the past can be explained by the willingness of current residents in the
community to shift pension obligations to future residents.” (footnote omitted)).
51. See Rose, supra note 42, at 893 (“Public trustees have long been held to a strict duty of
loyalty that, by design, limits their ability to direct the fund in ways that would not serve the
interests of the pension plan participants and their beneficiaries.”); see also EILEEN APPELBAUM
& ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN WALL STREET MANAGES MAIN
STREET 239 (2014) (discussing how the managers need to act in “the best interests of their
members”).
52. Rose, supra note 42, at 893.
53. Id. at 896 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 78(1) (AM. L. INST. 2003)) (“The
fiduciary duties of pension fund officials are based in long-standing trust doctrines . . . .”).
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This fiduciary duty extends to private and public pensions alike,54
and “modern portfolio theory” governs whether the investment
strategy of pension fund managers comports with this fiduciary duty.55
Whereas traditional limits on prudent behavior prohibited speculative
investment as unduly risky,56 modern portfolio theory rejects such a
categorical limitation and instead dictates that “the prudent investor
should seek to diversify risk, not to avoid risk altogether.”57 Thus,
rather than focus on risk relative to any individual investment, pension
fund managers should manage risk attendant to their investment
decisions through diversification of investment.58 As described by
Harry Markowitz, “Diversification is both observed and sensible; a rule
of behavior which does not imply the superiority of diversification must
be rejected both as a hypothesis and as a maxim.”59
Bolstered by this relatively expansive standard of prudent
investment and coupled with consistent decreases in returns from more
traditionally safe investments like U.S. Treasury Bonds,60 pension fund
54. Webber, supra note 11, at 2119–23 (describing how ERISA incorporates “traditional
fiduciary duties of trust law” and observing that the ERISA standard applies specifically to private
pension funds and practically to public pension funds).
55. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 249 (“[M]odern portfolio theory [has become]
the dominant approach for allocating pension fund assets.”).
56. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent
Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 856–57 (2010) (noting that traditional approaches
to prudent investment “mandated conservative investment strategies for trustees” and “excluded
investment in ‘speculative’ enterprises” (citations omitted)).
57. Id. at 854; see also Olivia S. Mitchell, David McCarthy, Stanley C. Wisniewski & Paul
Zorn, Developments in State and Local Pension Plans, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 11,
14 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds., 2010) (noting that, in an effort “to expand the
investment options available to state and local retirement plans,” state legislatures in the 1980s
began to relax the more restrictive limits on the prudence standard).
58. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 passim (1952); see also, Eric C.
Chaffee, Index Funds and ESG Hypocrisy, 71 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1295, 1302–03 (2021)
(observing that “Modern Portfolio Theory can be boiled down to a single word—diversification”
and that “[t]he end of Modern Portfolio Theory is profit.”).
59. Sterk, supra note 56, at 859 (citations omitted); see also SWENSEN, supra note 10, at 97
(“Creating a diversified portfolio with a range of equity-oriented asset classes that respond to
drivers of returns in fundamentally different fashion provides important underpinning to the
investment process.”).
60. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 242; see WEBBER, supra note 9, at 80 (observing
that U.S. Treasury bills are “widely considered the safest and most conservative investments in
the world”); see also SONDRA ALBERT, AFL-CIO HOUS. INV. TR., THE SUBPRIME CRISIS’
IMPACT ON FIXED-INCOME FUNDS 1 (2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/225030/
000116923207004677/d73205_40-24b2.htm [https://perma.cc/WZY6-LH6C] (noting that “[f]ixedincome instruments include bonds issued by governments, government-backed agencies and
companies to raise capital to cover their spending requirements,” but that “with interest rates at
historically low rates, investors have increased their taste for risk in order to gain higher returns”).
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managers increasingly have chosen relatively risky, short-term
investments to round out their portfolios.61 Indeed, one recent study
observes that 75 percent of pension fund “assets are held in what are
often called risky assets—stocks and alternative investments including
private equities, hedge funds, real estate, and commodities.”62
This risk-tolerant diversification strategy has led public pension
fund managers to invest in private equity funds, whose investment
strategy includes capitalizing on the high interest rates and fees that
characterize accessible credit for marginalized borrowers. Public
pension fund losses following the Great Recession most clearly reveal
this reliance on marginalized debt. But even after the lessons offered
by the Great Recession, pension funds continue to entrust their dollars
to private equity firms that make forays into marginalized debt-based
income enterprises like small-dollar installment lending.63
A. Pension Fund Investment in Pre-Great Recession Marginalized
Debt
In mid-July of 2007, the early days of the financial crisis that
spawned the Great Recession, the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (“CalPERS”), the country’s largest public pension
fund,64 told the Wall Street Journal that it had been minimally exposed
to toxic collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), the investment
bonds that were backed by consumer debt, including subprime
mortgages.65 A CalPERS spokesperson told the Journal that the
behemoth pension’s investments in collateralized toxic mortgages
amounted to just $140 million of its then-total of $245 billion in assets.66
61. Jean-Pierre Aubry, Anqi Chen & Alicia H. Munnell, A First Look at Alternative
Investments and Public Pensions, CTR. FOR RET. RSCH. AT BOS. COLL. (July 2017),
https://crr.bc.edu/briefs/a-first-look-at-alternative-investments-and-public-pensions
[https://
perma.cc/LH6C-PF25] (“Public pension plans have boosted their holdings in alternative assets,
defined as private equity, hedge funds, real estate, and commodities. This shift reflects a search
for higher returns, a hedge for other investment risks, and diversification.”); APPELBAUM &
BATT, supra note 51 (“Allocations to higher-risk alternative investments, such as private equity,
have been attractive when funds need to be shored up or meet retiree payments.”).
62. PEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 (footnote omitted); see also ALBERT, supra note 60, at
5 (observing that “public pension funds have also increased their investments in hedge funds in
an attempt to boost their returns due to larger funding requirements”).
63. Whoriskey, supra note 22.
64. WEBBER, supra note 9, at 9.
65. Stan Rosenberg, Public Pension Funds Avoid the Subprime Meltdown, WALL ST. J. (July
14, 2007, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118433634548665952 [https://perma.cc/
JLJ8-48D4].
66. Id.
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Moreover, the spokesperson averred that CalPERS intended to
continue investing in consumer mortgage debt over the next two years,
pending the addition of “personnel and building an analytical
infrastructure to support that effort.”67 Consistent with modern
portfolio theory, the spokesperson justified these investments in
ordinary consumers’ abilities to pay their mortgages and the attendant
elevated risks as being “just part of diversification.”68 Yet, a mere two
years later, once the enormity of the crisis became apparent, CalPERS
revealed in a lawsuit that it had in fact invested $1.3 billion in three
structured investment vehicles69 based on mortgage-backed securities,
and that it expected losses of over $1 billion.70
Like CalPERS, many pension funds invested in consumer
mortgage-backed securities in the years leading up to the Great
Recession.71 The origin story of these mortgage-backed securities is a
now a relatively familiar one. Following years of federal deregulation
of lending practices and attendant federal policy that encouraged
homeownership for all, loan originators “developed innovative loan
products to make mortgage credit more readily available to lower
income, but often higher risk, consumers.”72 These products—often
high-risk, subprime mortgages73—were bundled together to form
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin provide an excellent definition of the nowdefunct Structured Investment Vehicle. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale of Two
Markets: Regulation and Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 115. They explain that:
Structured Investment Vehicles or “SIVs,” were the shadow banks par excellence of
the pre-crisis era, combining aspects of a bank, a securitization, and a hedge fund. The
banks created and advised them initially as unregulated, off-balance sheet alter egos
holding assets that suffered unfavorable treatment under the bank capital rules. With
a SIV, such investment could be financed with an all-debt capital structure. The banks’
SIVs went on to become holders of diversified portfolios of actively managed, highlyrated (mostly securitized) assets funded through the issuance of medium-term notes
and commercial paper. Like a bank, a SIV arbitraged the spread in yields between longterm debt investments and short-term liabilities. Like a hedge fund, there was an
advisory relationship and an absence of deposit-based funding. Like a securitization,
there was a[] [special purpose entity]and tranched debt.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. Rick Brooks, Raters Sued by Calpers over Losses, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2009, 8:38 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124763258772743653 [https://perma.cc/R5KC-TVFU].
71. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 27, at 102.
72. A. Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 135, 140 (2008) (footnote omitted).
73. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau describes a subprime mortgage loan as “a
[higher interest rate] loan that is meant to be offered to prospective borrowers with impaired
credit records.” What Is a Subprime Mortgage?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
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pooled income streams that were then transformed into securities and
offered for sale.74 Pension funds invested significantly in these
consumer debt-based income streams.75
In theory, as long as subprime borrowers continued to pay their
relatively-high-interest mortgage debt as expected, institutional
investors of all stripes could have realized the expected higher return
on these subprime debt-laced investments. In other words, they would
have benefited from the relatively higher borrowing costs that
marginalized borrowers paid to buy a home. Yet, neither did this
“democratized credit” actualize its promise of greater socioeconomic
inclusion for marginalized borrowers,76 nor did it yield the tantalizingly
high-interest-rate-fueled gains that pension funds and other
institutional investors expected.77 Rather, built as they were on a
foundation of sand, many subprime mortgages quickly proved too
good to be true, and the ensuing tsunami of defaults that washed onto

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-subprime-mortgage-en-110 [https://perma.cc/8ZH355EV] (last updated Feb. 24, 2017) (explaining that “[t]he higher interest rate is intended to
compensate the lender for accepting the greater risk in lending to such borrowers” and that “[t]he
interest rate on subprime and prime [adjustable rate mortgages] can rise significantly over time”).
74. See, e.g., J. David Cummins & Christopher M. Lewis, Securitized Risk Instruments as
Alternative Pension Fund Instruments, in THE PENSION CHALLENGE: RISK TRANSFERS AND
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 268 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters eds., 2003) (observing
that “[s]ecurities have been introduced to trade the risk in ‘exotic underlyings’”).
75. It has been observed that
US public pension funds - the ones sponsored by states and other public
administrations - have bought more than $500m in CDO equity tranches, which are the
bottom and riskier slice of a bundle of bonds backed by debt, including home loans
such as sub prime [sic] mortgages, issued to households with a very poor credit history
or to those termed ‘NINJA’ (No Jobs No Income No Assets).
Maria Teresa Cometto, ‘Toxic Waste’ in Pension Funds, INV. & PENSIONS EUR. (Sept. 2007),
https://www.ipe.com/toxic-waste-in-pension-funds/25155.article [https://perma.cc/JN2Z-73GE];
see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 27, at 102 (noting that “[p]ension funds were big investors
in mortgage-backed securities” including those built on subprime mortgages); Bruce I. Jacobs,
Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17,
23 (2009) (“Securitization also allowed the expansion of funding for subprime mortgages to move
beyond the leveraged financial sector to such traditionally unleveraged investors as insurance
companies, pension funds, and mutual funds.”); Kristopher Gerardi, Stephen L. Ross & Paul
Willen, Understanding the Foreclosure Crisis, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 382, 385 (2011)
(“[T]he credit enhancements offered by AIG and other market players allowed much of this debt
to be securitized as AAA-rated securities and therefore sold to pensions funds, the Government
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), and other regulated investors.”).
76. See Atkinson, Borrowing, supra note 5, at 1459.
77. See Dickerson, supra note 72 (observing that the “push for a greater democratization of
credit generally resulted in lenders giving higher risk borrowers, a group generally characterized
as ‘subprime’ borrowers, greater access to credit in the form of non-traditional mortgage
products”).
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the shores of the global economy left pension funds in tatters.78 If
anything, the attempt to feed pension funds from a diet rich in
marginalized debt left both vulnerable groups at the bookends of these
transactions—workers and marginalized borrowers—in deep distress.79
B. Pension Fund Investment in Post-Great Recession Marginalized
Debt
Although securitized mortgages as fodder for investment fell from
grace following the Great Recession, public pension funds and other
institutional investors have continued to seek out similar alternative
investments whose value as a source of participant wealth
maximization is similarly rooted in marginalized debt. For example,
pension funds have turned in significant numbers to returns from
equity investment—“money that is invested in a company by
purchasing shares of that company in the stock market.”80
Before the rise of modern portfolio theory, equity investment was
“disfavored” as a prudent means of trust wealth maximization in light
of its elevated risk.81 Instead, risk-limited investments like government
bonds, including U.S. Treasury bonds, were deemed more prudent
sources of wealth accumulation.82 Yet with the rise of modern portfolio
theory’s sanction of increased risk relative to portfolio diversification,
“[e]quities now represent a larger share of trust portfolios, just as

78. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, Promises To Keep: Ensuring the Payment of
Americans’ Pension Benefits in the Wake of the Great Recession, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 393, 393
(2013) (noting that private and public pensions each lost 1 trillion dollars in asset value in 2008
alone); see also APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 250 (“Given their investment in risky
assets and their economic power to influence global financial markets, pension funds are
implicated in the financial crisis.”).
79. Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 1154–55; Scott N. Markley, Taylor J. Hafley,
Coleman A. Allums, Steven R. Holloway & Hee Cheol Chung, The Limits of Homeownership:
Racial Capitalism, Black Wealth, and the Appreciation Gap in Atlanta, 44 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L
RSCH. 310, 311–12 (2020) (observing that “[d]uring the housing boom, mortgage lenders targeted
Black spaces with subprime and predatory mortgage products, including adjustable-rate
mortgages and balloon loans that had high default rates,” and that “[f]oreclosures and attendant
home price depreciation, then, combined to erase over 50% of the Black wealth in the US during
the financial crisis” (citations omitted)).
80. What Are Equity Investments?, BLACKROCK, INC., https://www.blackrock.com/us/
individual/education/equities [https://perma.cc/ZG3A-3KZR].
81. E.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 681, 692 (2007) (“First, the
old prudent-man rule disfavored broad classes of equity holdings.”).
82. Id. at 683–85; Sterk, supra note 56, at 877–78 (noting that equity is riskier than fixedincome bonds).
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modern portfolio theory suggests they should.”83 Consequently, in
their quest to maximize retiree wealth, pension funds have turned to
private equity funds, providing “the largest source of equity capital for
[private equity] funds.”84 In turn, private equity funds have sought to
capitalize on the borrowing needs and habits of the most vulnerable
borrowers by taking relatively short-term equity stakes in businesses
whose profit margins depend on marginalized debt, including smalldollar installment lenders and other non-mortgage, “alternative” debtbased securities.85
1. A Primer on Private Equity Funds. Private equity firms make
money by serving as financial intermediaries between large capital
holders like “pension funds, mutual funds, . . . university endowments,”
and other institutional investors, and target operating companies.86
Private equity firms will open up a discrete fund that is structured as a
partnership, in which the firm will serve as the general partner in
charge of active management, and the investors will become limited
partners with a passive role in the fund’s decision-making.87 As general
partner, the private equity firm has principal discretion in selecting a
target for acquisition.88 Once determined, the firm generally
contributes a small fraction of the partnership’s equity contribution to
the purchase price, while the limited partner-investors supply the bulk
of the partnership’s equity sunk into the purchase price.89 Finally, the
lion’s share of the purchase price is usually paid with debt that is often
secured by the assets of the target operating company.90

83. Sterk, supra note 56, at 854.
84. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 43.
85. See, e.g., Nikou Asgari & Joe Rennison, Private-Equity Backed Companies Dominate
Lowest Depths of Junk, FIN. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/30e3ba95-617e4ef6-a2b4-ca2a32b7cf94 [https://perma.cc/36DS-JUGQ]; Joy Wiltermuth, Cracks in the $1.3
Trillion Auto-Finance Market Aren’t Curbing Investor Demand For Risky Debt, MARKETWATCH
(Feb. 20, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/cracks-in-the-13-trillion-autofinance-market-arent-curbing-investor-demand-for-risky-debt-2020-02-19 [https://perma.cc/
J7C6-W2XQ]; Robert Armstrong, Yield-Crazed Investors Pile Into US Subprime Car Loans, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/59f3a084-0d80-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84
[https://perma.cc/K3RB-Y4YQ].
86. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 43.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 41–43 (noting that the private equity firm “sponsor[s] investment funds that buy
out operating companies using high levels of debt”); Charlie Eaton, Sabrina Howell &
Constantine Yannelis, When Investor Incentives and Consumer Interest Diverge: Private Equity in
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Notwithstanding its relatively small equity outlay, however, the private
equity firm is generally entitled to “a major share of fund gains.”91
Once the acquisition closes, the private equity firm is both an
investor in and a manager of the operating company, while the
institutional investors maintain a largely silent equity stake in the
company.92 Ideally, the private equity firm will deploy its purported
managerial expertise and capital advantages to “unlock the untapped
potential in good companies or to turn around poorly performing or
failing ones,” thus benefitting both the investors in the private equity
fund as well as the various stakeholders in the operating company.93
Yet, in practice, commentators have observed that with its primary
concern of extracting value for the benefit of itself and its fund’s
institutional investors,94 private equity firms often manage the
operating company so as to squeeze as much value out of the company
during the typical three-to-five year life95 of the fund, without care of
any negative consequences on the operating company itself or the
stakeholders in the operating company’s vitality.96 For example, the
private equity firm might layoff more workers than necessary in order
to increase the short-term revenues for the fund’s investors.97
Moreover, once the fund is finished with ownership and sells the target
operating company, it often leaves that company saddled with debt.98

Higher Education 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24976, 2018) (“Private
equity buyouts can affect target firm operations and finances . . . [and] are typically accomplished
using debt that is collateralized by target firm assets.”).
91. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 41; Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor:
Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17, 57 (2008)
(describing “PE’s modus operandi [a]s to leverage its assets via debt, buy companies or their
subsidiaries, take them private, dispose of corporate assets to pay off debt and to pay themselves,
and sell out”).
92. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 50 (2009) (“Investors . . . contribute only
money, not management [and are] almost always large institutional investors, such as university
endowments, public pension funds, and other substantial pools of money . . . .”).
93. Id. at 49–50 (“Private-equity investment typically begins with a group of individuals
deciding to offer their labor (and often their money) as asset managers through an investment
advisory entity that will raise funds, identify investment opportunities, and subsequently oversee
equity investments in target firms.”).
94. See Eaton, Howell & Yannelis, supra note 90, at 4 (“[P]rivate equity owners have higherpowered incentives to maximize firm value . . . .”).
95. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 43.
96. Id. at 42, 73.
97. Id. at 73.
98. Id. at 42.
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2. Private Equity and “Subprime Higher Education.”99 In
September 2019, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and U.S.
Representative Mark Pocan (D-WI) wrote to Andrew Sheiner,
Founder and Managing Partner of Atlas Partners, a large private
equity firm.100 They inquired about Atlas’s structure and finances as
they related to their investment in for-profit colleges, 80 percent of
whose revenues come from federal student aid, including student
loans.101 Senator Warren and Representative Pocan’s letter—which
they sent to eight other private equity firms—arrived in the wake of
Professors Charlie Eaton, Sabrina Howell, and Constantine Yannelis’
2018 study of private equity buyouts in the for-profit higher education
sector. Their findings suggested that private equity firms were targeting
for-profit educational firms to capture guaranteed profits generated
from federal subsidy of student loans and grants.102
For-profit schools are educational institutions that operate under
a business model that depends on marginalized debt as the main source
of profit.103 A form of “tax-payed financed capitalism,”104 they rely
primarily on federal student aid, including loans and grants, for their
revenue.105 Most of the students who attend for-profit schools have to
borrow money to pay tuition and fees.106 These borrowers are also
largely culled from socioeconomically marginalized communities, i.e.,
“disproportionately poor, minority, single parents, and military

99. Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime Higher
Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 441 (2012) (describing for-profit education).
100. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., & Mark Pocan, U.S. Rep., to Andrew Sheiner,
Founder, Alta Partners (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-0910%20Letters%20to%20PE%20Firms%20re%20For%20Profit%20Colleges.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TTQ3-YXML].
101. Id.
102. Eaton, Howell & Yannelis, supra note 90, at 2.
103. See David Deming, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence Katz, For-Profit Colleges, 23 FUTURE
CHILD. 137, 138 (2013) (“During the past fifteen years, youth from minority and disadvantaged
backgrounds and those ill-prepared for college increasingly and disproportionately have enrolled
in programs at for-profit colleges.”).
104. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 73 (observing that “another source of private
equity gains is a transfer from workers to private equity”).
105. Braucher, supra note 99, at 440.
106. Ariel Gelrud Shiro & Richard V. Reeves, The For-Profit College System Is Broken and
the Biden Administration Needs To Fix It, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/01/12/the-for-profit-college-system-is-brokenand-the-biden-administration-needs-to-fix-it [https://perma.cc/R6QA-SVXB] (“71% of students
in for-profit colleges borrow federal loans, as compared to only 49% of students in 4-year public
schools.”).
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personnel.”107 Because of these attributes, Professor Jean Braucher
observed that, “the label ‘subprime higher education’ accurately
captures the nature of the risk to individual students” particularly those
who borrow money to attend.108
Against this backdrop, Eaton, Howell, and Yannelis study
whether high-powered maximizing incentives induce focus on subsidy
capture.109 To test this inquiry, they examine eighty-eight private equity
buyout deals involving for-profit schools, which encompassed “557
school-level ownership changes” and acquisition or establishment of
“an additional 437 new schools.”110 They observe that following the
private equity buyout, “reliance on federal aid increases” even as
student outcomes deteriorate.111 In other words, their evidence
suggests that private equity firms enter into the for-profit education
business to extract value for themselves and their investors through
“federal aid capture” before leaving the school’s marginalized student
borrowers holding the proverbial bag.112 Moreover, private equity
funds need not concern themselves with student outcomes. Indeed,
because funds and their institutional investors take their value when
student aid is first disbursed at the beginning of the teaching period,
they profit whether or not the marginalized student gains any benefit
from the education.
3. Expanded Private Equity Investment in Marginalized Debt. On
behalf of their institutional investor-partners, private equity firms
continue to target a range of other businesses whose profits depend
significantly on marginalized debt, including small-dollar installment

107. Braucher, supra note 99, at 441–42; Vasanth Sridharan, Note, The Debt Crisis in ForProfit Education: How the Industry Has Used Federal Dollars To Send Thousands of Students into
Default, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 331, 334 (2012) (“For-profit colleges and universities
tend to draw a lower-income, older population.”).
108. Braucher, supra note 99.
109. Eaton, Howell & Yannelis, supra note 90, at 20.
110. Id. at 1.
111. Id. at 1–2.
112. Id. at 9, 14–15. For example, Eaton, Howell, and Yannelis observe that in the wake of
the buyout: class sizes increased; the instructor to student ratio increased; average loans per fulltime student borrower increased; graduation rates dropped; student-in-repayment rate dropped;
and default rates on student loans increased. Id. at 18–20; see also Kathleen Conn, For-Profit
School Management Corporations: Serving the Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 133 (2002)
(noting that “when for-profit school management companies take over the functions of traditional
public education . . . non-shareholding constituencies, namely the students and parents, have little
to no bargaining power vis a vis the corporate directors, and may be at their mercy in the absence
of adequate regulatory safeguards”).
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lenders who offer small amounts of unsecured money at relatively high
interest rates to a customer base that chronically struggles with
income.113 For example, in 2013, Warburg Pincus, “a leading global
private equity firm,” invested in Mariner Finance, whose self-described
mission is to “provide hard-working consumers responsible access to
credit through respectful, compassionate, and efficient service.”114 Less
euphemistically, however, Mariner sells small-dollar installment loans
between $1,000 and $25,000 at high interest rates to people who need
money, capitalizing on the financial distress of economically vulnerable
people.115
Warburg Pincus offered investment in Mariner Finance as a part
of a $2.3 billion private equity fund, “Warburg Pincus Financial Sector,
L.P.”116 In trumpeting the closing of the fund, Warburg Pincus boasted
that “[t]he Limited Partners who have committed to the Warburg
Pincus Financial Sector Fund include existing investors in Warburg
Pincus’ funds and new investors to the firm, including leading public
and private pension funds.”117 Ultimately, “[d]ozens of other
investment firms bought Mariner bonds . . . allowing the company to
raise an additional $550 million,”118 with which it could continue to
engage in questionable and predatory practices. For example, a recent
report alleged that Mariner engaged in mass-mailing checks,
permitting “customers to accept a high-interest loan on an impulse”;
extracted interest on loans as high as 36 percent; and engaged in
“aggressive collection practices that include calling delinquent

113. Whoriskey, supra note 22 (“Private equity firms, with billions to invest, have taken
significant stakes in the growing [small-dollar installment loan] field.”); James Rufus Koren, Need
a Loan? Forget the Corner Payday Lender—Your Boss Has You Covered, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trueconnect-comcast-20180805story.html [https://perma.cc/C898-N4AN] (“Installment loans typically are made for at least
$2,500 and are structured to be paid back over a year or more, causing borrowers to repay many
times the loan amount.”).
114. MARINER FIN., https://www.marinerfinance.com [https://perma.cc/G4WX-3SQ2];
Mariner Finance, WARBURG PINCUS, https://www.warburgpincus.com/investments/marinerfinance [https://perma.cc/3EUG-YWHD].
115. See Whoriskey, supra note 22 (“The company enables some of the nation’s wealthiest
investors and investment funds to make money offering high-interest loans to cash-strapped
Americans.”).
116. Press Release, Warburg Pincus, Warburg Pincus Closes $2.3 Billion Financial Services
Fund (Dec. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Warburg Pincus Press Release], https://warburgpincus.com/
2017/12/18/warburg-pincus-closes-2-3-billion-financial-services-fund [https://perma.cc/T9F92QPK] .
117. Id.
118. Whoriskey, supra note 22.
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customers once a day and embarrassing them by calling their friends
and relatives.”119
Another marginalized debt-based investment included in the
Warburg Pincus fund portfolio was Santander Consumer USA.120 By
its own description, Santander Consumer USA is in the business of
“[h]elping drivers reach their destinations, regardless of credit.”121 Less
euphemistically, however, Santander Consumer USA, is “the nation’s
largest subprime auto financing company,” and it holds a reputation
for preying on subprime consumers.122 For example, in May 2020,
following a multistate investigation into its “subprime lending
practices,”123 Santander agreed to pay $550 million to settle a lawsuit
brought by the Attorneys General of thirty-three states and the District
of Columbia.124 The states “accused Santander of extending loans that
were too big relative to borrowers’ incomes, charging excessive fees[,]
and failing to monitor dealership loan-approval practices.”125 In
addition to monetary relief, Santander agreed to refrain from
predatory practices, like offering car loans to consumers whose car
payment would exceed their monthly income and “requiring dealers to
sell ancillary products, such as vehicle service contracts.”126 Similarly,
in 2017, Santander Consumer USA agreed to pay $2.75 million to

119. Id.
120. Warburg Pincus Press Release, supra note 116.
121. Auto Financing, SANTANDER, supra note 19.
122. Shepardson, supra note 19.
123. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Attorney General Raoul Announces $550
Million Settlement With Nation’s Largest Subprime Auto Financing Company (May 19, 2020),
https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2020_05/20200519.html [https://perma.cc/4W8XPF53].
124. Id.; Final Consent Judgment at 5–8, State v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 2020CH-04242 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 13, 2020).
125. Ben Eisen & AnnaMaria Andriotis, Santander Settles Predatory Auto-Lending Claims
for $550 Million, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/santander-to-paystates-550-million-to-settle-allegations-of-predatory-auto-lending-11589906880
[https://perma.cc/C8ED-VFXC]. For example, California alleged that Santander violated the
California Unfair Competition Law by, in part, “originating loans and purchasing installments
contracts with a high likelihood of failure [and] exposing consumers to unnecessarily high levels
of risk.” Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief at 3,
People v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 20-CIV-02157 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2020).
126. Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Announces
Over $550 Million Settlement with Nation’s Largest Subprime Auto Financing Company,
Delivering Relief to Hundreds of Thousands of Struggling Consumers (May 19, 2020),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorney-general-james-announces-over-550-million-settlementnations-largest [https://perma.cc/6P49-KN3R]; SANTANDER MULTI-STATE AG SETTLEMENT,
https://santandermultistateagsettlement.com [https://perma.cc/7X84-Y4NL].
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Delaware auto-buyers after an investigation by the Delaware and
Massachusetts Attorneys General revealed that Santander engaged in
predatory practices in the sale of its car loans to consumers.127
Moreover, in 2015, the United States Department of Justice sued
Santander, alleging that Santander violated the Service Members Civil
Relief Act by illegally repossessing cars from military servicemembers
and illegally assessing loan fees.128 Santander settled the lawsuit,
agreeing to pay $9.3 million in restitution and $2.5 million in fines.129
Warburg Pincus and its institutional investors, including pension
funds, are not alone in feeding on marginalized debt as a source of
wealth accumulation. Blackstone Group L.P., one of the largest private
equity irms, sold its stake in Lendmark Financial Services LLC to
another private equity firm, Lightyear Capital LLC, in 2019.130
Lightyear partnered in the purchase with the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan (“OTPP”), Canada’s largest single-profession pension
plan.131 Like Mariner Financial, Lendmark Financial Services sells
subprime small-dollar installment loans to marginalized consumers.132
Nevertheless, in heralding the deal, OTPP’s Executive Managing
Director proclaimed that: “Ontario Teachers’ is delighted to partner
with Lendmark’s strong management team and investment partner
Lightyear to work together to take the company into its next phase of
growth.”133
*

*

*

127. Press Release, Delaware Department of Justice, Santander Consumer USA Holdings,
Inc. To Pay $2.875 Million to Delaware Consumers Over Sub-Prime Auto Loans (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://news.delaware.gov/2017/03/29/sc-2 [https://perma.cc/T93J-BRZ5].
128. Complaint at 2, United States v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00633-B
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2015).
129. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection Settles with Santander Consumer USA Inc. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial-protectionsettles-santander-consumer-usa-inc [https://perma.cc/S2ZY-UKQH].
130. David French, Blackstone To Sell Lendmark Financial to Lightyear Capital: Sources,
REUTERS (June 24, 2019, 1:31 PM), https://reut.rs/2xbJ00Y [https://perma.cc/4QCG-AZP6]
(noting that Blackstone purchased Lendmark in 2013).
131. Elliot Sloane, Lightyear Capital and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan To Acquire
Lendmark
Financial
Services,
BUSINESSWIRE
(June
27,
2019,
2:23
PM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190627005795/en/Lightyear-Capital-OntarioTeachers%E2%80%99-Pension-Plan-Acquire [https://perma.cc/RYB4-8YD7].
132. See French, supra note 130.
133. Sloane, supra note 131.
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In sum, as the largest contributors of capital to private equity
firms, pension funds have indirectly participated in the targeting of
marginalized debt-based investment as a source of wealth
maximization. This is disturbing because, while other institutional
investors might be adjudged as unduly profit-minded, pension funds
arguably should be less mercenary in light of their social welfare
mandate. Indeed, that pension funds—concerned as they are with
securing the retirement income of ordinary workers—have
increasingly diversified their portfolios with marginalized debt-backed
investments reveals something important about the precarity of
retirement saving in the U.S. public-private welfare system. It reveals
how far individual workers and their financial intermediaries must now
go to engage in the self-help retirement funding that now characterizes
the U.S. public-private welfare regime. Counterintuitively then, in the
case of pension funds as institutional investors (and most likely in the
near future for individualized retirement saving accounts), one way to
think about marginalized debt is that it, at least, serves a public good
because it furnishes a means from which working people might
increase their retirement security.134 Yet this comes at the expense of
further entrenching the financial precarity of millions in this country.
II. RETIREMENT INSECURITY IN THE SELF-HELP WELFARE STATE
Retirement security in the United States has become significantly
tied to the ups and downs of financialized markets. It is in this context
that one might best understand why public pension funds have
increasingly looked to capitalize on the borrowing habits and
misfortunes of the most marginalized borrowers. Beginning with its
alignment with the tenets of New Deal Keynesianism, in which
government-subsidized social insurance was deployed to “redistribute
across risk and income groups in a way that private insurance under
competitive conditions could not,”135 modern retirement security has
succumbed to the same privatization and retrenchment that now
characterizes other aspects of the social welfare system.136 Increasingly,
individual workers have been required to fend for themselves in their

134. Cf. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 74 (“Retirement pensions can be justified on
many grounds: as a means of pulling the elderly out of poverty, as a way to remove older
employees from the workplace, as a spur to long and committed service with an employer, or as
a mechanism for encouraging long-term savings.”).
135. Id. at 101.
136. Id. at 163–64.
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golden years, and both individual retirement savers and more
traditional pension funds must now rely on the investment market to
meet their significant liabilities. Indeed, the public-private welfare
regime has thoroughly shifted retirement security into the hands of
private financial markets and strictly financial actors. The latter include
private equity firms, whose fiduciary duties and profit-sensitive
incentives eschew any broader moral considerations of the source or
consequences of their aim to accumulate wealth.137
A. A Brief History of Employment Pensions in the U.S.
Pensions originated as tools to incentivize and reward faithful and
loyal military service.138 In 13 B.C., Augustus Caesar first established a
systematic pension regime funded by the state in order to “reward and
mollify” soldiers who risked life and limb for the benefit of the
empire.139 This system was remarkable for its dedicated use of state
funds to accomplish the broader social goal of “ensur[ing] that warriors
had a vested interest in the perpetuation of the system and the state
that funded it.”140 Since then, state-funded public pensions have taken
various forms to serve varying state and public interests, including to
provide for injured soldiers and their families,141 soldiers’ widows,142
and needy or otherwise destitute citizens.143 In these iterations of

137. Whoriskey, supra note 22 (quoting the general counsel of a subprime lender as follows:
“We operate in a competitive environment on narrow margins, and are driven by that competition
to offer exceptional service to our customers. . . . A responsible story on our industry would focus
on this reality.”).
138. ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR
PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 24–26 (2003) (describing how the provision of a sum of state
funds offered in exchange for completed military service traces its history at least back to Roman
practices of rewarding soldiers for faithful service and allegiance to the Empire).
139. Id. at 26.
140. Id. at 26–27; see also Vauhini Vara, The Real Reason for Pensions, NEW YORKER (Dec.
4, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-real-reason-for-pensions [https://
perma.cc/TY8R-4DCD] (“Emperor Augustus’s new pensions were expensive: he paid for them
partly out of his own pocket, but also, to the disgruntlement of some subjects, with new taxes.”).
141. E.g., Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE
L.J. 1538, 1586–87 (2018) (describing the Continental Congress’ passage of pension legislation for
“soldiers whose injuries during Revolutionary War service left them unable to earn a livelihood”
and the First Congress’ assumption of those pension payments).
142. Kristin A. Collins, “Petitions Without Number”: Widows’ Petitions and the Early
Nineteenth-Century Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements, 31 LAW HIST. REV. 1, 5–8
(2013).
143. E.g., CLARK, CRAIG & WILSON, supra note 138, at 2, 6 (“From their earliest days, the
American colonies provided pensions to disabled men who were injured defending the colonists
and their property from native uprisings.”). See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
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pensions, the state largely assumed primary responsibility for the
provision of benefits in order “to serve ‘deserving’ groups . . . or to
provide occupational benefits to government workers,” neither goal
including those aged out of the workforce.144 In other words, states
were not focused on retirement.
Modern employment pensions arose in the mid-to-late nineteenth
century to serve a different purpose; namely, to provide “insurance
against the loss of earnings during retirement.”145 These employment
pensions were guided by a work-focused rationale. Specifically, they
were meant to encourage “long and committed service” while
simultaneously encouraging older workers, deemed to have long
passed their employment prime, to vacate their positions and make
way for younger and newer employees.146
Public employment pensions, in which the federal, state, or local
government is the employer, first emerged in the mid-nineteenth
century when a small number of states and municipalities began to
offer disability and retirement benefits to their police and fire
department workers.147 New York City proffered the first such
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1992) (describing the deep history of pension provision, particularly to widows and their children,
as a form of social provision in the nineteenth century).
144. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 73, 85 (describing these “governmental” pensions
as based in “service to community, church, or country” rather than rooted in the “modern
concept” of “retirement”).
145. Id. at 73, 79, 92 (stating that “none of these varied initiatives – public employee pensions,
veterans’ pensions and insurance, mothers’ pensions – was really public social insurance for the
aged”); see Ellman & Merrett, supra note 43, at 377–78 (“The medieval or even colonial concepts
of a compassionate and generous sovereign rewarding his humble, devoted subjects is completely
alien to our modern views of a democratic government’s obligations to its citizens.”);
GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 53–54 (“Pensions are better described as insurance contracts and
schemes, rather than a simple deferred wage. The former speaks of a complex relationship among
risk, perception of risk, and the distribution of premiums paid and benefits disbursed; the latter
of the individual’s optimal trade-off between consumption now and consumption later.”).
146. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 74; GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 66. Hacker
further notes that thwarting unionization was also a “goal” for modern employment pensions.
HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 103, while Ghilarducci describes another perspective that
views public employment pensions “as patronage and not as relief or rightful compensation,”
GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 11. At a theoretical level, Ghilarducci describes three broad
normative rationales underpinning employment pension provision, namely: (1) the neoclassical
economic view that “see[s] pensions as a convenient financial intermediary allowing individuals
to make choices between consumption now and consumption later”; (2) the Marxist view that
sees “pensions as control devices”; and (3) the institutionalist view that embraces a combination
of both of the latter, seeing pensions as a form of “industrial feudalism.” Id. at 2–5.
147. CLARK, CRAIG & WILSON, supra note 138, at 4. Clark et al. clarify, however, that “these
early public plans either were disability plans or, if they were retirement plans, were largely
funded by the workers themselves.” Id.
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municipal retirement pension plan in 1857 to police officers who were
injured while performing their duties.148 This plan was revised some
twenty years later to include a retirement benefit for those police
officers who had served on the force for at least twenty-one years.149
Similarly, throughout the end of the nineteenth century and into
the twentieth century, increasing numbers of municipalities and states
began to extend employment pension benefits to a wider range of
government workers, like teachers.150 By one account: “By 1920,
pension coverage in the public sector was relatively widespread, with
all federal workers being covered by a pension and an increasing share
of state and local employees included in pension plans.”151 Moreover,
as described in greater detail below, state and local pension plans
“gr[ew] in earnest” following the passage of the Social Security Act
(“SSA”) in 1935.152
Private employment pensions, in which a private entity is the
employer, emerged in the late nineteenth century as “industrialization
finally produced old workers with ties to their companies.”153 These
early plans were rooted in “welfare capitalism” insofar as they
functioned on the “benevolence” of private employers “rather than on
labor empowerment or coercive state action.”154 American Express
offered the first formal private pension plan in 1875.155 Subsequently,
private pension plans multiplied, and by the onset of the Great
Depression in 1929, there were over four hundred private pension
plans covering almost three million workers.156 Nevertheless, private

148. Mitchell et al., supra note 57, at 12.
149. Id.
150. CLARK, CRAIG & WILSON, supra note 138, at 4–5.
151. Id. at 5. But see HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 87 (arguing that “[t]he most striking
feature of U.S. social policy before the New Deal was the almost complete failure of the broadbased programs for social insurance that were then tentatively taking root in other industrializing
nations”).
152. Mitchell et al., supra note 57, at 12.
153. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 3–5.
154. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 88.
155. JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 116 (2008) [hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT RISK
SHIFT].
156. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 88; see also GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 23
(noting that most of those covered by private pensions in this period “were elite members of the
work forces of large and paternalistic firms”); HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155
(“Although formal plans grew in number in the early twentieth century, most salaried and wage
workers were still on their own when it came to retirement.”).
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until,
perhaps
pensions
were
relatively
uncommon157
counterintuitively, the nationalization of social provision engendered
by the SSA’s passage helped spur the proliferation of pension plans
more generally.158
The SSA passed in the midst of the Great Depression, spawned by
the 1929 stock market crash.159 For the first time, Congress authorized
a national program of Old Age Insurance (“OAI”), rooted in President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s conviction that “social insurance against the
cost of retirement was needed, and that it should be compulsory,
contributory, and national in scope.”160 As a cornerstone of the New
Deal progressivism,161 OAI was “financed by mandatory contributions
from employers and employees” and “pa[id] to covered earners, on
their attainment of age sixty-five, benefits tied to their previous
earnings.”162 Recipients were eligible upon retirement as a matter of
right and without reference to individual need, unlike previous federal
need-based pension provisions exemplified by soldiers’ and mothers’
pensions.163 Although conservatives worried that OAI would cause
retirement provision to shift too far from the U.S. ethos of selfreliance,164 the advent of nationalized retirement insurance ultimately
had the opposite effect. OAI encouraged the growth of employersponsored pensions, which, in the spirit of U.S. self-reliance, linked

157. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 95 (noting the “inadequacy” of private pensions
before the New Deal). Hacker explains that: “Behind the celebratory rhetoric of welfare
capitalism, however, the reach of private pensions was exceedingly limited and uneven, and
federal encouragement and regulation of private pensions was as minimal as was government
support for all other forms of social protection during this period.” Id.
158. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 20.
159. E.g., KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN
GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972, at 60 (2016); HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 96 (observing that
“the economic need of the 1930s made the sheer insufficiency of private pensions grossly
manifest”).
160. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 106; see id. at 95 (observing that the SSA “did what
welfare capitalism could not: provide broad retirement protection”); see also TANI, supra note
159, at 9, 60–61 (noting that in addition to Old Age Insurance, the SSA also established needbased income support).
161. See, e.g., HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 108 (describing the passage of the SSA as
“unquestionably the single most important enactment in the history of U.S. social policy”).
162. TANI, supra note 159, at 60–61.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., ERIC LAURSEN, THE PEOPLE’S PENSION: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFEND SOCIAL
SECURITY SINCE REAGAN 13 (2012) (noting that conservative politicians opposed the passage of
the SSA for these reasons); HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 98 (observing that “business
support [for OAI] was extremely limited”).
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benefits to work,165 and, in some cases, employers even “buil[t] their
plans on top of Social Security.”166
In that regard, private pensions proliferated in the years following
World War II.167 The rapid growth of private pensions between 1935
and 1950 responded to a combination of forces, including the relative
“stagnation” and lack of meaningful expansion of OAI in the 1940s,
political motivation to expand “private plans as a temporary substitute
for public programs,” pension-based tax advantages for employers, and
increased demand by high-income workers for whom OAI was less
advantageous.168 With respect to public pensions, the SSA initially
excluded state and local government employees from coverage.169
Nevertheless, public employment pensions similarly flourished in the
years following the passage of the SSA.170 Half of the largest public
pension plans were established between 1931 and 1950, with many
forming themselves in OAI’s image insofar as they tethered benefits
solely to years of service and age at retirement.171
In sum, employment pensions emerged as aspects of the U.S.
social provision system halfway through the twentieth century.
Beginning with welfare capitalism in the private sector, and state and
municipal moves to provide retirement benefits to certain civil servants
in the public sector, employment pensions have grown into an
important and enduring pillar of the tripartite public-private structure
of U.S. retirement social provision: “Social Security, employersponsored pension plans, and personal savings.”172 Importantly,
however, as they were developed in the shadow of Social Security,
many public pensions function as an alternative to Social Security,
leaving public employees to rely largely on public pensions for
retirement security.173
165. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 98; id. at 106 (noting Roosevelt’s political strategy
expressly included the link between employee contributions and benefits, which gave
“contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and unemployment
benefits”).
166. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155, at 117.
167. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 112.
168. Id. at 112–13.
169. Mitchell et al., supra note 57, at 13.
170. Id. at 12–13.
171. Id.
172. LAURSEN, supra note 164, at 19.
173. WEBBER, supra note 9 (observing that “millions of public sector workers—40 percent
of them—are not entitled to participate in Social Security” because of their public pensions); see
also Anenson, Slabaugh & Lahey, supra note 29, at 31 (“In the thirteen states where pensions are
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B. Shifting the Risk of Retirement Security
Retirement security is risky business. There is risk of insufficient
funding given that accounting for a comfortable retirement can be an
exercise in reading tea leaves.174 There are a multitude of unpredictable
factors that must be considered like morbidity, mortality, and the
number of dependents, whose occurrence, magnitude, and cost only
time can actually reveal.175 Even if occurrence, magnitude, and cost
could be adequately predicted, funding those needs involves significant
expense.176
Initially by design, these risks were borne largely by both private
and public employers, who developed “defined benefit” programs for
which they largely assumed the responsibility to fund and which
purported to ensure retirement income.177 Over time, however, the
ideal of a pension fund as a meaningful and reliable aspect of
retirement security, whose risk was rightly borne largely by employers,
has worn away. It has been replaced by a retirement security regime in
which private employees increasingly bear the risk of realizing a fully
funded retirement. Consequently, at least as an indirect result of
political choices, public employees can no longer trust that they will see
the retirement compensation promised by their public employers.178
1. Shifting Retirement Risk from Employers to Employees.
Traditionally, many public and private employment pensions were

a substitute for federal Social Security benefits, we believe that [pension reform is] even more
likely to be barred as a constitutional harm because public pension benefits are the one and only
retirement payment from any government in these states.”).
174. See HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155, at 114 (observing that retirement
forecasting “involves a relatively complex set of calculations”).
175. See Goldman & Sterk, supra note 13, at 112 (“A plan’s funding ratio incorporates a
variety of contestable actuarial assumptions: at what age and at what salary will beneficiaries
retire, how long will they live, and what investment returns will the pension fund generate.”);
GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 72 (“The employer’s cost of promising one dollar of a defined
benefit promise is a function of various factors [including] length of job tenure, salary profiles,
morbidity, and mortality.”).
176. Sterk, supra note 56, at 858–64 (describing various risks associated with retirement
pensions).
177. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 53–54; WEBBER, supra note 9, at 89–90.
178. E.g., Adam Hayes, The Social Meaning of Financial Wealth: Relational Accounting in
the Context of 401(k) Retirement Accounts, 5 FIN. & SOC’Y 61, 64 (2019) (observing that
“[c]hanges in how Americans save for retirement since the 1980s – in particular, the shift from
guaranteed pensions to individual retirement accounts – have fashioned a generation of selfresponsible retirement savers” and that as a consequence, “individuals implicitly have nobody to
blame but themselves for accumulating too small of a nest egg”).
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structured as “defined benefit” programs.179 Defined benefit programs
entitle workers to a fixed amount as calculated by factors such as time
of employment, salary history, and age at retirement.180 Employer and
employee contributions are put into a trust—the pension fund—from
which, upon the worker’s retirement, the employer must pay the
agreed-upon fixed benefit over a period of time.181 Consequently,
employers administering a defined benefit pension plan bear the risk
that the pension fund assets will be insufficient to meet the liabilities of
the participants.182 As summarized by one commentator,
[T]raditional defined benefit pensions have four major characteristics
as a matter of plan design. First, they provide income on a deferred
basis at retirement and not before then. Second, [they] provide such
retirement income as periodic, annuity-type payments rather than as
single lump sums. Third, [they] are funded collectively, the
employer’s contributions being pooled in a common trust fund from
which all participants receive their benefits. Finally, [they] place[] on
the employer rather than the employee the obligation to fund the
benefit promised to the participating employee. If the funds in the
trust are inadequate to pay promised benefits, the employer is
obligated to make up the shortfall.183

The risk of insufficient funding was quite significant for both
public and private pensions.184 Yet it was in the private pension context
that pension reform came to the fore. In 1963, the Studebaker-Packard
company became the “poster child” for the grave consequences of
institutional pension fund failure when its automobile plant in South
Bend, Indiana, shut down under the weight of prohibitively high labor

179. See HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 153.
180. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (2004)
(“[F]or example, a prototypical defined benefit formula specifies that a participant is entitled at
retirement to an annual income equal to a percentage of her average salary times the number of
years of her employment with the sponsoring employer.”).
181. Id. at 456.
182. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155, at 115 (noting that defined benefit
plans overall shift the risk of uncertainty onto employers); James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious
Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA,
49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 685 (2001) (noting that with respect to defined benefit plan pensions, “[o]ne
source of risk was underfunding” and that “[United Auto Worker] retirement plans almost never
had enough assets to pay all of their pension obligations”).
183. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 456 (footnote omitted).
184. Wooten, supra note 182, at 698 (“Virtually all defined-benefit pension plans came into
being with benefit obligations that far outstripped the assets set aside to pay those obligations.”).
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costs.185 Subsequently, Studebaker-Packard promptly defaulted on
millions of dollars in pension obligations.186
Congress subsequently intervened in private pension provision by
formally studying the problem187 and then passing the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).188 ERISA was
intended to transfer the risk of insufficient funding directly onto
employers by mandating that employers meet certain funding and
disclosure requirements.189 It imposed a duty of prudent and loyal
investment onto private pension fund managers to manage the fund “in
the sole interest of the pension plan participants.”190 Moreover, to
provide a buffer against the kinds of massive losses the StudebakerPackard plant workers experienced, ERISA established the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation to provide insurance to workers for
pension promises.191
ERISA was a bit of an anachronism from its inception. By 1974,
private employment pensions were evolving from the then-familiar
model of a defined benefit program, promising a fixed sum and bearing
the burden of adequate funding, toward a more individualized
conception of retirement security and its inherent risks.192 As explained
by political scientist Jacob S. Hacker: “the vision at the core of ERISA
looked to the past, to the union-negotiated plans that had arisen in the
1940s and 1950s, even as the private pension system was rapidly moving
away from this traditional organization.”193 Instead, emboldened
private employers began to move away from the burdens of defined
benefit programs toward defined contribution pension plans by the
185. Id. at 726.
186. Id. (noting that “the liability of the Studebaker pension plan exceeded its assets by $15
million,” which in today’s dollars is approximately $126 million).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 739; see also HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 125 (describing ERISA as “at
once a challenge to the autonomous operation of private plans and an affirmation of their central
place in the American welfare regime”).
189. Forman, supra note 13, at 1218–19 (“ERISA protects the pension benefits of most
private-sector workers through sweeping participation, coverage, vesting, benefit accrual,
funding, and reporting rules.” (footnotes omitted)); GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 89–90.
190. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 90; Webber, supra note 11, at 2122 (“ERISA codifies
the traditional fiduciary duties of trust law, including the duties of loyalty and prudence.”)
(footnote omitted).
191. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 89–90; HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note
155, at 111 (noting that “historically, nine out of ten workers get full benefits when their plans are
taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation”) (footnote omitted).
192. See HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 125.
193. Id.

ATKINSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

12/17/2021 4:06 PM

COMMODIFYING MARGINALIZATION

807

time ERISA passed in 1974, amidst the widespread economic discord
of the 1970s economy, the steady decline of the long-term employee,
and the onset of significant changes to the Tax Code.194
Unlike defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans impose a
much smaller burden and very limited risk on employers.195 The
employer is merely obliged to contribute a fixed amount periodically
to an employee’s retirement account, often defined “as a percentage of
the participant’s salary for that year.”196 Once that contribution is
made, the employer bears no further obligation to secure the
retirement prospects of its employee.197 Instead, the employee bears
the full weight of ensuring that the retirement savings will be sufficient
upon retirement.198 To that end, dissimilar from defined benefit
programs in which the employer is responsible for managing the
pension fund, defined contribution plans commonly require employees
to be directly responsible for maximizing investment to account for
their financial needs during retirement.199 Thus, as explained by
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky:
Since the employee’s entitlement under the plan is the balance of
her individual account, good investment performance redounds to the
employee’s benefit (because her account balance is larger), while,
symmetrically, poor investment performance hurts the employee
(because her account balance is smaller and the employer has no
obligation to fund a defined benefit).200

194. Id. at 153–56.
195. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 455; James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian,
Plan Design and 401(k) Savings Outcomes, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 275, 275 (2004) (noting that
“[d]efined contribution pension plans place the burden of ensuring adequate retirement savings
squarely on the backs of individual employees” but also that “employers make many decisions
about the design of 401(k) plans that can either facilitate or hinder their employees’ retirement
savings prospects”).
196. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 455 (“Having made that contribution, the employer’s
obligation to fund is over because the employee is not guaranteed a particular benefit, just a
specified input.”).
197. Id.
198. Id. (“In a defined contribution context, the participant’s ultimate economic entitlement
is the amount to which the defined contributions for her, plus earnings, grow or shrink.”).
199. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 9, at 163; Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of
Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 942 (2013) (observing that in the context of
defined contribution plans, “[t]he amount of funds available for retirement depends on
investment success”).
200. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 457.
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Perhaps the most well-known defined contribution retirement
plan is the 401(k) program.201 Authorized by an amendment to the Tax
Code in 1978,202 401(k) savings accounts most exemplify the rapid rise
of defined contributions as the model private retirement security
program.203 Initially passed to address the problem of “elective salary
reductions arrangements” that decreased tax liabilities for certain
profit-sharing, employer-employee relationships, 401(k) inadvertently
spawned a new means of deferred compensation as retirement
savings.204 Under section 401(k), employees are authorized to redirect
a percentage of untaxed earnings into an employer-sponsored account,
in which their employer would also frequently match any amount that
the employee redirects.205 With the support of the incoming Reagan
administration, 401(k) retirement accounts “burgeoned,” and by the
1990s “rose from obscurity to become one of the most celebrated
vehicles of private retirement savings.”206
Importantly, 401(k) retirement plans give individual workers
control over the management of accumulated funds.207 For example,
workers may elect the amount of wages to be redirected to the
accounts.208 When the worker leaves the employ of the account
sponsor, they can take any accumulated amount as a lump-sum
distribution or roll it over into another similar retirement savings
vehicle.209 Moreover, workers may borrow against those funds for
certain sanctioned purchases, like home down payments.210

201. Id.
202. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
203. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 457 n.12.
204. Id. at 483–84; HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 165 (observing that “[s]ection 401(k)
passed completely beneath the radar screen of public debate,” and that “no one in Congress
recognized how significant it would become”).
205. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 483–84.
206. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 165.
207. Hayes, supra note 178, at 68 (noting that “401(k) allocations are strictly self-selected by
employees without any input or nudging from their employer; people choose their own
portfolios”).
208. E.g., Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and Other
Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 478 (2004) (“An employee must (1) elect
to participate in the plan, (2) elect her rate of contribution, (3) choose how to invest such
contributions[,] and (4) decide what to do with the assets when switching jobs.”).
209. Id. at 477–78 (“Section 401(k) plans are better suited to a mobile workforce since a
participant generally can rollover his 401(k) account to his new employer’s plan.”).
210. See id. at 492–95.
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While this greater control has been lauded as giving individual
workers greater autonomy over their retirement futures,211 the
financial outcomes still have been generally unfavorable for workers,
particularly those with relatively lower incomes.212 One important
reason is that “many employees do not make optimal financial
decisions,”213 including regularly exhibiting a short-term bias in
decision-making.214 Consequently, greater autonomy in decisionmaking must be offset against the features of defined benefit plans,
such as restrictions of individual choices, that make them a better
vehicle for long-term savings.215
In sum, defined contribution plans like 401(k) accounts epitomize
“an individualized conception of retirement savings” that aligned well
with Reagan-era, neoliberal thinking that prized and prioritized
“private property and individual autonomy.”216 In this regard, the
evolution of private pension funding from defined benefit to defined
contribution reflects what Hacker has termed the “Personal
Responsibility Crusade” that has characterized the “political drive to
shift a growing amount of economic risk from government and the
corporate sector onto ordinary U.S. individuals in the name of
enhanced individual responsibility and control.”217 This move to selfhelp social provision in the employment pension space has left workers
with tremendous responsibility and tremendous risk in managing what,

211. E.g., Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 485 (noting that “the financial services industry . . .
[has] emphasized the investment autonomy of the individual 401(k) participant and IRA
holder”).
212. Teresa Ghilarducci & Amanda Novello, The Labor Consequences of Financializing
Pensions, in THE CONTRADICTIONS OF PENSION FUND CAPITALISM 31, 47 (Kevin Skerret,
Johanna Westar, Simon Archer & Chris Roberts eds., 2017). Ghilarducci and Novello argue that:
The current system of 401(k)s generates low returns for most people after the
regressive tax benefit, high fee, and risk adjustment made for undiversified liquid
portfolios are taken into account. . . . Because individuals in the bottom 60% or so of
households (by income) get little tax relief as a result of their low marginal tax rate, the
retirement accounts for these households can easily earn negative real returns after
deductions for fees are taken into account.
Id.; see also David H. Webber, The Other Janus and the Future of Labor’s Capital, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 2087, 2096 (2019) (observing that “the greatest threat to labor’s capital and labor’s
shareholder activism is the 401(k)”) (footnote ommitted).
213. James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Are Empowerment and Education
Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, in 2005 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 151, 153 (William Brainerd & George Perry eds., 2005).
214. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155, at 115.
215. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 115.
216. Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 469; HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 163.
217. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155, at 8.
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if any, retirement savings they accumulate in the defined contribution
pension world.218
2. Public Pensions and Risk. Public employers have not been
immune from this shift into self-help retirement security. They, too, are
succumbing under the weight of their obligations, shifting to
incorporate defined contribution aspects into their traditional defined
benefit regimes. Several public pension plans have begun to transform
into hybrid programs that offer newer employees a combination of the
more secure defined benefit plans that fully cover their senior
colleagues and a defined contribution component which public
employees must manage.219
For example, in the wake of a funding crisis, the Board of Regents
of the University of California (“UC”) approved a hybrid pension
system that applied to all employees hired after 2016.220 The new plan
limited future UC employees to one of two options.221 They could
select a hybrid retirement plan that included a defined benefit plan
with an income salary limit (as determined by the California Public
Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013) combined with a “401k-

218. E.g., Zelinsky, supra note 180, at 485 (“One way of describing the services provided to
401(k) plans and their participants is that these services are the diseconomies of scale that result
from decentralized investing, the diseconomies avoided under the defined benefit format with its
centralized investment of a common pool of capital.”); Gelter, supra note 199 (“[W]ith a [defined
contribution] plan, potential retirees bear the investment risk because the employer does not have
to jump in if the plan assets do not suffice to meet pension obligations.”).
219. E.g., JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & KEVIN WANDREI, CTR. FOR RET. RSCH., HAVE
LOCALITIES SHIFTED AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS? 1–4 (2020), https://
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SLP70.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG7W-D7BM] (“Since 2009,
a total of 13 alternative plans have replaced stand-alone [defined benefit] plans at the local
level . . . [of which] three were hybrids . . . .”); THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HYBRID PUBLIC
PENSION PLANS 1 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/04/hybrid-publicpension-plans_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9TG-QQ3Z] (“Ten states have adopted hybrid
pension plans that combine smaller, defined benefit pensions with defined contribution plans.”);
Carol Anderson, Hybrid Pension Plans Attracting More States, Cities, GOVERNING (Aug. 2012),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190809134955/https://www.governing.com/gov-hybrid-pensionplans-attracting-more-states-cities.html [https://perma.cc/637K-KSU7] (same).
220. Task Force Submits Recommendations on New Retirement Benefits for Future UC
Employees; Final Decisions Expected from UC Regents in March Following Input from UC
Community, UCNET (Jan. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Task Force Submits Recommendations],
https://ucnet.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/2016/01/task-force-submits-recommendations-onnew-retirement-benefits-for-future-uc-employees-final-decisions-expected-from-uc-regents-inmarch-following-input-from-uc-community.html [https://perma.cc/G6X3-8K38].
221. Id.
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style”222 supplemental defined contribution benefit subject to IRS
salary limits.223 Alternatively, the employee could select a “[p]ure
[d]efined [c]ontribution [a]pproach[,]” which functions as a “standalone defined contribution (DC) plan with benefits-eligible employee
pay up to the Internal Revenue Code limit.”224
UC’s pension reform is evidence that the driving motivation for
the shift to hybrid public pension plans has been to rein in costs in light
of the increasing financial precarity of state and municipal budgets
relative to their significant pension liabilities.225 UC’s move to a hybrid
pension plan grew out of tense budget negotiations between then-UC
President Janet Napolitano and then-California Governor Jerry
Brown in 2015.226 Resistant to raising tuition to make up the shortfall,
Brown agreed to a $436 million infusion to help the ailing UC system’s
pension burdens in exchange for UC’s agreement to reform its pension
system to rein in its costs.227 Thus, even public employment pensions
have succumbed to the allure of reduced risk and responsibility
engendered by defined contribution pensions, increasingly leaving
their employees with primary responsibility for retirement security.228
Private pension evolution has also circumscribed how public
pensions may approach their ostensible mandate to provide for the
retirement security of ordinary government workers. Although exempt
from ERISA, many public pension funds rely on ERISA’s

222. R. Stickney, Napolitano Proposes UC Pension Changes, NBC SAN DIEGO (Mar. 11,
2016, 1:56 PM), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/california/uc-system-pension-proposedchanges-napolitano/123623 [https://perma.cc/G4B7-S2X8].
223. Task Force Submits Recommendations, supra note 220.
224. Id.
225. Id.; Paul M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1353, 1363 (“[T]he significant underfunding of pensions has had a major impact on state and
local finances.”).
226. Jennifer Medina, In California Budget Plan, Brown Wins Deal on Tuition Freeze for InState Students, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/us/in-californiabudget-plan-brown-wins-deal-on-tuition-freeze-for-in-state-students.html
[https://perma.cc/H93T-ADRC].
227. Id.
228. Anderson, supra note 219 (noting that “[defined contribution] accounts may have the
same pitfalls as 401(k) plans have had in the private sector” leaving individual employees “to
navigate the perils of the investing world on their own and could end up retiring in a down market,
losing a big chunk of their nest egg”); see also HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155,
at 123 (arguing this shift also allocates blame to the employee when they fail to meet their
retirement goals).
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management standards as a guide in administering their own plans.229
Consequently, ERISA has had a significant effect on the development
of public pensions, where it “operates as a type of shadow law,
governing the funds’ conduct even though it is both inapplicable and
unenforceable against them.”230 Specifically, many state legislatures
have chosen to incorporate ERISA’s fiduciary duties into their own
rules that govern their public pensions.231 Thus, “the shared language
governing public pension funds in states whose fiduciary duties mirror
ERISA’s makes [Department of Labor (“DOL”)] or federal court
interpretations persuasive, if not binding, and some state courts look
to ERISA and federal cases construing fiduciary duties when there is a
dearth of state case law on the subject.”232
Yet, as Professor David Webber argues, ERISA’s duty of loyalty,
as interpreted by its implementing agency, the DOL, “is a particularly
bad fit for public pension plans” because it “elevat[es] the interests of
outside investment managers above fund participants and
beneficiaries.”233 ERISA’s exclusive purpose rule incorporates “the
traditional fiduciary duties of trust law, including the duties of loyalty
and prudence.”234 Official DOL interpretations of the exclusive
purpose rule permit plan fiduciaries to prioritize fund performance
even when this “fund first” approach diverges from the economic
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.235 For example, the
“fund first” approach would permit a public pension fund to select
investments in order to “undermine participant employment” as long
as those investments were “of equal economic value to a plan.”236
To illustrate, Webber describes the choice of the Florida
Retirement System (“FRS”), which represents Florida’s public school
teachers, to invest in a private company, EdisonLearning, Inc., that
contracted to run public schools and “attracted favorable recognition
from those sympathetic to the school choice movement and for-profit
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1); Ellman & Merrett, supra note 43, at 373 (observing that
“[n]either ERISA nor the PBGC have any role in the creation, administration, modification,
enforcement, or termination of public pension plans”).
230. Webber, supra note 11, at 2121.
231. Id. at 2120–21.
232. Id. at 2121.
233. Id. at 2121, 2123.
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (duty of loyalty); id. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (duty of prudence);
Webber, supra note 11, at 2122.
235. Webber, supra note 11, at 2122–25 (describing two DOL Interpretive Bulletins issued
in 1994 and 2008).
236. Id. at 2142–44.
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education, including elected officials.”237 The state’s public school
teachers opposed Edison, challenging “its claims about improving test
scores and assert[ing] that its business model relied on pushing out
experienced teachers in favor of newer, lower-cost teachers while
shifting other costs to the public sector.”238 The teachers also opposed
the reelection of then-Governor Jeb Bush who supported
“privatization of public schools, promotion of school vouchers, and
criticism of teachers unions,” and who served “as [a] truste[e] on the
Florida State Board of Administration, which directs investment for
the [FRS].”239
Upon Bush’s reelection, Liberty Partners, a private equity firm
whose only client at the time was FRS, invested FRS’s money in
Edison, buying the company.240 Edison was in direct competition with
Florida’s public-school teachers. As reported by a consulting firm that
FRS hired to conduct a review of Liberty Partners, “Liberty [was]
responsible for ‘negative’ investment-picking skills, lack of
diversification in its investment portfolio, sloppy record keeping[,] and
overcharging the pension fund to the tune of at least $88 million since
inception in 1993.”241 Yet as Webber explains:
Under DOL’s investments of equal value rule, Bush and the State
Board of Administration could have directed the Florida Retirement
System to purchase Edison Schools because it undermined
participant employment and economic interests, so long as [the State
Board of Administration] could show that the risk/return, liquidity,
and diversification properties for the Florida retirement fund itself
alone were equal to other potential investments. Whether the Edison
investment might have been chosen for this reason is difficult to say,

237. Id. at 2144–45; see also Conn, supra note 112, at 139 (“Edison Schools, Inc. and its
associated Edison Project are the creations of media entrepreneur Christopher Whittle, who
legitimized the project by enlisting the former President of Yale University, Benno Schmidt, Jr.,
to head his education team.”).
238. Webber, supra note 11, at 2145.
239. Id. at 2145–46.
240. Id.; see also Vineeta Anand, Consultant Gives Failing Grade to Florida’s Private Equity
Manager, PENSIONS & INV. (Nov. 10, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/
20031110/PRINT/311100721/consultant-gives-failing-grade-to-florida-s-private-equity-manager
[https://perma.cc/TB9D-A656] (“The American Federation of Teachers, the AFL-CIO, the
Florida Education Board, the Service Employees International Union, and the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees all vehemently oppose[d] the proposed
investment of the pension fund’s assets in Edison.”).
241. Anand, supra note 240.
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but the example points to the possibility that it could have been
chosen for this reason, illustrating the problem.242

In other words, post-ERISA, a public pension fund’s fiduciary duty
could validly encompass investment behavior that would undermine
the overall welfare of the public employees it is supposed to protect.
This is because what matters most is the fund’s ability to make money,
regardless of how making money affects the employees’ interests.
C. Delegating Retirement Security to Financialized Markets
The main challenge for both aggregated and individualized
retirement security is persistently inadequate funding, making
investment returns crucial.243 A pension plan is sufficiently funded “if
the plan has sufficient assets to meet its emerging benefit obligations
in a timely fashion, given reasonable assumptions about future
contributions and investment income.”244 In light of this threshold, the
very real dilemma of underfunding is perhaps most clear with respect
to public pension funds, where, for example, a recent report observes
that “on average, state pensions are only 71 percent funded –
amounting to more than $1 trillion dollars in debt.”245 Moreover, for
public pensions, this massive shortfall has broader implications since
“the significant underfunding of pensions has had a major impact on
state and local finances.”246 Put simply, taxpayers are liable for pension
promises on the occasion that the pension fund fails to meet its
obligations.247 And the task of raising taxes or drumming up other

242. Webber, supra note 11, at 2146.
243. Estes & Kremling, supra note 30 (noting the “increasing focus on funding the rapidly
growing deficit in public pension plans and on how to address the problem”).
244. Forman, supra note 13.
245. States Are Struggling To Fund Pensions—Here’s Why, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 5,
2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/video/2019/states-are-struggling-tofund-pensions-heres-why [https://perma.cc/79Q9-THZB] (further observing that “[t]he bill for
this debt has crowded out public spending on schools, roads, and public safety”); Beermann, supra
note 11, at 4 (observing that “many state and local governments are sitting on a fiscal time bomb—
underfunded public employee pension and health care liabilities”). But see Estes & Kremling,
supra note 30 (observing that “[t]here are wide discrepancies in these estimates depending on the
actuarial assumptions on life span, benefits, rate of return and retirement ages” and speculating
that “the total deficit in all states’ pension funds at present range between $3.2 trillion and $6
trillion”).
246. Secunda, supra note 225.
247. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 43 (“When a municipal government promises a future
payment to a worker, it creates a financial liability for its taxpayers.”).
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public revenue to meet this obligation “creates an increasingly bitter
political pill for legislators.”248
Consequently, pension funds have begun to diversify their
investment strategies in an attempt to increase their actual rates of
return,249 and, in so doing, they are turning to equity investments in the
hopes of higher yield.250 For example, one study notes that 75 percent
of pension fund assets “are held in what are often called risky assets—
stocks and alternative investments including private equities, hedge
funds, real estate, and commodities.”251 Meanwhile, although 401(k)
funds have regularly invested in “mutual funds, bank collective
investment trusts, and insurance company pooled accounts with
portfolios focused on publicly traded stocks and bonds,” the Trump
Administration proffered an information letter sanctioning the
investment of 401(k) funds in private equity funds.252 This endorsement
is likely to open the floodgates of private equity investment there as
well.253
248.
249.

Estes & Kremling, supra note 30, at 77.
E.g., ELLIOT HENTOV, HOW DO PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS INVEST? FROM LOCAL TO
GLOBAL ASSETS 5 (2018), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/asset-allocation/2018/insthow-do-ppfs-invest.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WG3-LWSH] (studying asset allocation data between
2008 and 2016, and observing that “in response to unconventional monetary policy after 2008,
[public pension funds] universally undertook a definitive shift into higher risk assets, particularly
away from fixed income,” and into “equity and alternative allocations”).
250. PEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also Amy Whyte, The Pandemic Hasn’t Kept
Pensions From Hiring Private Equity Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1p3wmj5dnswtl/The-Pandemic-Hasn-t-KeptPensions-From-Hiring-Private-Equity-Managers [https://perma.cc/FK4E-LY5J]
(reporting investment data “that pension funds committed $20 billion to private equity in the third
quarter [of 2020], more than the $17.8 billion invested in the same period [in 2019]” and that “[t]he
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, New York State Teachers’ Retirement System,
Washington State Investment Board, and State of Wisconsin Investment Board were the most
active investors during the third quarter [of 2020]”).
251. PEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
252. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., INFORMATION LETTER (2020),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/informationletters/06-03-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3PY-4TJL]. In this Information Letter, the DOL has
endorsed the “use of private equity investments in designated investment alternatives” for
participants in individualized retirement accounts, like 401(k) plans, that require individual
workers to secure their own retirement security away from the benefits of aggregation enjoyed
by workers enrolled in public and private pension programs. Id.
253. See, e.g., David Kudla, Private Equity in 401(k)s: Is It Right for You?, FORBES (June 26,
2020, 5:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkudla/2020/06/26/private-equity-in-401ks-is-itright-for-you [https://perma.cc/FK8T-3KYT] (noting that with respect to 401(k) investment in
private equity, “now employees have to be cognizant of these inherent risks [of private equity
investment] now that the option is available in their 401(k)”); see also Brent Arends, PrivateEquity Crowd Wants Your 401(K) Money: ‘Yikes!’, MARKETWATCH (July 24, 2020, 1:04 PM),
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Equity investment in debt-centered industries is increasingly
among the alternative investments that have captured the eyes of the
financial intermediaries tasked with managing the vast wealth of public
pension funds. For example, CalPERS decided to invest in the banking
business in the summer of 2020, as it was in a “desperat[e]” position
relative to its underfunded pension obligations.254 It faced “hundreds
of billions in unfunded future pension debt, persistently basementscraping interest rates and now a pandemic-ravaged economy.”255
Indeed, tasked with earning fifty-eight cents of every dollar promised
to California’s “[r]etired DMV clerks, former firefighters and aging
government bean-counters” from the investment market,256 the ailing
CalPERS needed a new source of returns to help meet its liabilities.257
Consequently, in the spring of 2020, CalPERS’ Board of
Administration approved a new investment strategy that authorized
the deeply underfunded pension giant to invest in “risky ventures” like
direct lending.258 Thus, like other big public pension funds, CalPERS
decided to “wad[e] into the rollicking market for private debt”259 in its
search for higher returns. In this regard, CalPERS is representative of
the consequences of ever-expanding privatization and financialization
of U.S. retirement security. More specifically, CalPERS’ choice to
invest in banking reveals the deep significance of debt in the broader
search for wealth accumulation in the U.S. public-private welfare
regime.260
In sum, retirement security has now come to depend heavily on
successful investment in financial markets as a primary source of
accumulation, as opposed to retirement security that is accomplished
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/yikes-the-private-equity-crowd-wants-your-401k-money2020-06-11 [https://perma.cc/6KLY-CTJY] (noting that private equity firms stand to make $180
billion in profits a year from 401(k) funds).
254. Christopher, supra note 10.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. (noting that CalPERS manages $400 billion in pension assets).
259. See id. (reporting CalPERS’s deputy chief investment officer statement that, “[w]e need
every arrow in the quiver we can get, and private debt is one of the critical ones,” and that for
CalPERS, “[t]here isn’t a no-risk choice”).
260. Political scientist Jacob Hacker defines the public-private welfare regime as a
combination of: (1) “direct-spending social programs” like Social Security, (2) “the constellation
of more indirect or ‘hidden’ government interventions,” like tax breaks and government
subsidies, “that are designed to provide similar social benefits or shape their private provision,”
and (3) “publicly-regulated and subsidized private benefits.” HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at
11–12.
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“collectively by the state.”261 Accordingly, “financialized
accumulation” now rests at the heart of successful retirement
provision, firmly tethering retirement security to the fluctuations of
private financial markets.262 This shift is true at both ends of the
spectrum: traditional defined benefit pension funds and individuals
with a singular 401(k) account have little option but to invest their
money in riskier financial markets in order to accumulate enough to
meet their needs.263
III. COMMODIFYING MARGINALIZATION
Because marginalized debt is a valuable asset, so too are the set of
unfavorable socioeconomic conditions that steadily produce
marginalized borrowers who must use this debt both for survival and
opportunity.264 Therefore, to the extent that private equity funds and
their public pension partners (among other institutional investors)
value marginalized debt as a source of wealth extraction, they have an
implicit vested interest in the continued socioeconomic subordination
that maintains a steady supply of marginalized borrowers who have no
option but to pay more to borrow. Indeed, marginalized “debtpower”—the generative capacity of marginalized borrowing265—is a

261. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF PENSION FUND CAPITALISM, supra note 212, at 3; see also
News Release, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Department of Labor Issues
Information Letter on Private Equity Investments (June 3, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/
newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200603-0 [https://perma.cc/DS2U-BCL9] (“Private equity
investments have long been part of the investment portfolios used by defined benefit plans to
fund retirement benefits for many American workers, but they generally have not been
incorporated into investment funds used by defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans.”).
More generally, the rise of financialization—“a pattern of accumulation in which profit making
occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity
production”—in the U.S. (and indeed in the global economy more generally) has added another
significant layer to the growing precarity of workers’ retirement well-being in the public/private
welfare state. Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3
SOCIOECONOMIC REV. 173, 181 (2005).
262. Dick Bryan & Mike Rafferty, The Financial Responsibilities of Our Grandparents:
Toward a Political Economy of Pension Restructuring, in THE CONTRADICTIONS OF PENSION
FUND CAPITALISM, supra note 212, at 79, 92.
263. Id.
264. See Chrystin Ondersma, Borrowing Equality: Dispossession and the Need for an
Abolitionist Approach to Survival Debt, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 299, 301 (2020) (defining “survival
debt” as “debt that individuals incur in order to survive and live a life of human dignity” and
“opportunity debt” as “debt that enables an individual to acquire wealth, such as procuring or
expanding a home or business”). Ondersma argues for “an abolitionist approach to survival debt
and a reformist approach” to opportunity debt. Id.
265. For more information on debt-power, see infra note 273 and accompanying text.
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valuable commodity from which pension funds and other institutional
investors may extract wealth. This phenomenon reveals the familiar yet
perverse value of marginalization and, more generally, how institutions
continue to commodify and trade on the subordinate status of
marginalized communities.266
A. Accumulating Wealth from “Debt-Power”
The familiar “labor-power” frame deployed in the capitalism
discourse is a useful, though admittedly imperfect, means by which to
consider the generative capacity embodied in the debt-power of a
community of marginalized borrowers.267 Under traditional
production-based theories of capitalism, the capital owner purchases
the worker’s labor-power—the generative capacity of the worker’s
labor—to extract surplus value (profits) and accumulate wealth.268
There is an exploitative element in this arrangement insofar as
traditionally, other than wages, the worker derives no additional value
from any surplus realized by means of their labor-power. Thus, one
critique of this arrangement is that the capitalist takes advantage of the
worker’s need to sell his labor for subsistence.269
The U.S. economy has shifted from its principal basis in the
production of goods to one rooted in finance. In a world of
financialized capitalism, “profits accrue primarily through financial
channels rather than through trade and commodity production.”270
Significant here, financialization at the household level is characterized

266. See Caitlin Rosenthal, Capitalism When Labor Was Capital: Slavery, Power, and Price
in Antebellum American, 1 CAPITALISM 296, 302 (2020) (observing that “the crucial characteristic
of capitalism is not commoditization itself but the power to commoditize”).
267. See, e.g., id. at 301 (defining capitalism as “the commoditization of labor [that] results
from . . . the accumulation of capital”).
268. E.g., JOHN E. ROEMER, FREE TO LOSE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST ECONOMIC
PHILOSOPHY 4 (1988); Rosenthal, supra note 266, at 298 (observing that “[t]he centrality of wage
labor to understanding capitalism has never been about the wage itself, but rather what this mode
of compensation tells us about underlying capital relations”).
269. See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 351 (2011) (observing that
“[m]arxists have questioned whether wage labor is ultimately free in any sense (since someone
with nothing to sell but his or her body cannot in any sense be considered a genuinely free agent),
but they still tend to assume that free wage labor is the basis of capitalism”).
270. Krippner, supra note 261, at 174, 176 (arguing that “financialization not only offers an
apt characterization of the world in which we live, but a productive one, clarifying key issues in
current areas of debate in the social sciences”); Gerald F. Davis & Suntae Kim, Financialization
of the Economy, 41 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 203, 205, 216 (2015) (observing that financialized
capitalism “is observable at three levels: industry, firm, and household” and that globally, “[t]he
United States clearly stands out as the most financialized economy”).
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by increasing levels of household debt.271 Thus, the rise in consumer
willingness to borrow money to fund their lives—which I refer to as
their debt-power—is now a basis for wealth accumulation in a world of
financialized capitalism, much like labor-power was the basis for
wealth accumulation in production-based capitalism.272 Specifically, for
institutional investors including pension funds, marginalized consumer
debt-power is increasingly the major source of profits and wealth
accumulation as its “profits . . . accrue increasingly through financial
channels.”273 The increasing investment in marginalized debt by private
equity funds on behalf of their institutional investors, including
pensions funds, bears this out. It helps to explain why private equity

271. Davis & Kim, supra note 270, at 205.. Indeed, by one account, “[o]wing to greater access
to credit by the general population, accompanied by stagnant income, household consumption
was increasingly maintained not by earnings but by accumulating debts.” Id. at 205–06. Moreover,
increased financialization has been associated with increased economic inequality and other
adverse effects on consumers, particularly marginalized consumers. Id. at 211. It has been
observed that:
Increased debt, in turn, led to increased mental stress, and this association was greatest
among middle- and lower-class Americans who are forced to borrow but have the least
resources for repayment. . . . Simply put, whereas those who have extra assets to invest
enjoy increasing returns, those who cannot join such markets suffer more, enlarging
the wealth gap of the entire society.
Id. Specifically, the increase in household debt was made possible, in part, by securitization, “the
process of taking assets with cash flows, such as mortgages held by banks, and turning them into
tradable securities (bonds).” Id. at 207. Securitization has transformed consumer debt into a
powerful investment vehicle, through which lenders of all stripes can pass on both the benefits
and risks of lending to investors. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 27, at 40.
272. See ROEMER, supra note 268, at 94–96 (describing the “[c]apital [m]arket—[l]abor
[m]arket [i]somorphism” in which he posits that exploitation would appear in a capital market by
the same process in which it appears in a labor market).
273. KRIPPNER, supra note 39, at 27–28; Krippner, supra note 261, at 175–76 (noting that
“changing patterns of profitability suggest[] that financialization is the key development in the
US economy in recent decades”); see also Christopher Witko, How Wall Street Became a Big
Chunk of the U.S. Economy—And When the Democrats Signed On, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/29/how-wall-street-became-a-bigchunk-of-the-u-s-economy-and-when-the-democrats-signed-on [https://perma.cc/VKX6-C3ZF]
(observing that “[m]odern economies depend on a thriving financial sector,” and noting that
“[s]cholars and politicians alike point to the ‘financialization’ of the economy — and an increased
reliance on the financial sector to create growth — as the root cause of many of our economic
problems”). Costas Lapavitsas and Ivan Mendieta-Munoz have similarly observed that:
One of the most salient aspects of the financialisation of the US economy has been the
rise of profits earned through financial activities, including lending and borrowing of
money capital, managing money stocks, insurance, trading in financial assets, and even
dealing in assets that are not directly financial but have acquired a strong financial
dimension, such as housing and real estate.
Costas Lapavitsas & Ivan Mendieta-Muñoz, Explaining the Historic Rise in Financial Profits in
the U.S. Economy 3 (Univ. of Utah, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2017-06, 2017).

ATKINSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/17/2021 4:06 PM

820

[Vol. 71:773

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

firms currently “own over 5,000 storefront payday and online lenders
that make loans at 300% annual percentage rates (APR) and more.”274
B. Incentivizing Marginalization
To the extent that institutional investors rely on interest rates and
fees as the primary means of wealth accumulation,275 then an army of
potential borrowers, from whose debt-power profits might be realized,
is necessary.276 For those investors in marginalized debt specifically,
marginalized debt-power is itself a valuable asset, as is the continued
marginalization of communities for whom this type of debt is generally
intended. An analogy to labor-power as discussed in other contexts is
again instructive on this point. In production-based notions of
capitalism, wages are the price of labor-power as a commodity.277 The
theory expects that profits will rise to the extent that wages remain low.
The lower the wages required to produce, the higher surplus value
available to capital owners for their accumulation.278 Moreover, the
theory also expects that wages will remain low relative to profits
provided that there is a surplus of labor-power relative to available
capital investment.279 For this reason, capital owners would benefit
from an economically-depressed “industrial reserve army” that was not
yet fully integrated into the capitalist system but was prepared to enter
should the need for labor arise. Consequently, scholars have posited
that this need for excess labor has incentivized, for example, continued

274. Private Equity-Owned Payday Lenders Profit by Trapping People in Debt, AMS. FOR
FIN. REFORM EDUC. FUND (Feb. 2020), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/02/AFREF-Private-Equity-Payday-Lenders-FS-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ YGZ4-LW8R].
275. E.g., Lapavitsas & Mendieta-Muñoz, supra note 273.
276. See MAURICIO LAZZARATO, THE MAKING OF THE INDEBTED MAN 23 (2011) (“In
neoliberalism, what we reductively call ‘finance’ is indicative of the increasing force of the
creditor-debtor relationship.”); see also Costas Lapavitsas, The Financialization of Capitalism:
“Profiting Without Producing”, 17 CITY 792, 796 (2013) (observing that “[t]he epochal turn of the
capitalist economy toward finance reflects a malaise in the realm of accumulation [by
production]” while “financialization is about capital seeking profits in the realm of finance”).
277. KARL MARX, WAGE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL 20, 22–23 (Int’l Publishers Co. 1933)
(1847).
278. Id. at 36.
279. Id. at 26–27 (“Wages will now rise, now fall, according to the relation of supply and
demands, according as competition shapes itself between buyers of labour-power, the capitalists,
and sellers of labour-power, the workers.”); see also ROEMER, supra note 268, at 25; see also id.
at 4 (“This process permits accumulation and economic growth. But workers are, in the same
process, unfairly treated, and this unfair treatment constitutes the essential inequity of a system
based on the private ownership of the means of production.”).
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unemployment and other precarious states of being from which could
arise new members of the industrial reserve army of labor.280
Similarly, to the extent that marginalized debt-power is a
significant commodity in a financialized world, then institutional
investors have a vested interest in maintaining a steady supply of
potential marginalized borrowers—a financialized version of the
“reserve army,” ready to borrow the types of subprime, high-interestrate products endemic to marginalized communities. In other words,
the appetite for value accrued from investment in marginalized debt
incentivizes leaving socioeconomic conditions such that a surplus of
people are forced to borrow both for survival and for opportunity while
simultaneously limiting their ability to borrow at prime and
conventional interest rates.
In fact, what makes marginalized debt profitable is the high rate
of interest justified by the default risks associated with the precarious
circumstances of marginalized communities. In socioeconomic distress,
lenders find the most profits. For example, Professors Pamela Foohey,
Robert Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah Thorne have
examined the difficulties of borrowers that exist in the “sweatbox.”281
The sweatbox is the time in which distressed borrowers are on “the
brink of defaulting on their debts,” which permits lenders to “charge
high interest rates and fees and otherwise profit from their customers’
financial misery.”282
It is while debtors are in the sweatbox, in a state of chronic or acute
financial distress, that lenders can squeeze the most profits from them,
in part because those borrowers are a captive constituency due to their
high-risk status.283 For example, per Professor Ronald Mann’s account
of the sweatbox with respect to credit cards,
The successful credit card lender profits from the borrowers who
become financially distressed. . . . As the credit card borrower spirals
downward, however, with the monthly balances growing to amounts
that equal, or even surpass, the borrower’s annual income, the issuer

280. MARX, supra note 277, at 25.
281. Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, Life in the
Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219, 220–21 (2018).
282. Id. at 220.
283. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 375, 388 (observing that “the standard way [for credit card lenders] to increase profits
is to focus on those customers who are unable to take their business elsewhere” and that “[i]f the
customers do not have realistic options, lenders are free to raise the interest rates and fees that
they charge to those borrowers”).
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begins to earn large monthly profits on the relationship. The question
for the lender is how long the borrower will remain in the unstable
position before failure occurs.284

This latter question is also important for the lender’s institutional
investors because it is similarly their sweet spot for participant wealth
maximization. Indeed, it gives some context to why Santander
Consumer USA allegedly decided to offer auto loans whose payments
exceeded the monthly disposable income of the borrowers.285
Santander has no incentive to lend to people who have the ability to
pay because, following Ronald Mann’s credit card insights that
“[f]inancially secure customers or ‘convenience users’ do not generate
any interest income, late fees, or overlimit penalties,” that is not where
the value exists.286 Rather, the profit lies in maintaining a reserve army
of marginalized people who, in the self-help welfare state, must rely on
debt for income smoothing,287 and who will struggle with the high
interest rates, fees, etc. for as long as they can before ultimately
defaulting.288 In the meantime, private equity firms can report positive
outcomes for their institutional investors, including those that have
invested significantly in subprime lenders and other purveyors of
marginalized debt. Consequently, because marginalization is central to
the business of those lenders, entrenched marginalization is itself a
valuable commodity.289
C. Pitting Borrowers Against Workers
The rise and institutionalization in U.S. culture of employment
pensions has added a significant social benefit insofar as it has fostered
a means of subsistence in old age.290 In this regard, one might
understand the continued existence of marginalized debt that
supplements pension funds as serving a public good given that
retirement security, and pensions more specifically, are “central[] to

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
Mann, supra note 283, at 387.
Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 1106.
Foohey et al., supra note 281, at 220.
PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE
THEY BORROW, AND WHY 15 (2012), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
pcs_assets/2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTN3-ANCA] (observing
that “repeat borrowing is the norm” for most payday borrowers).
290. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155.
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modern social policy.”291 Pensions developed as a means of relieving
families and, if not families, then the state, from the burden of having
to care for old people who could no longer work.292 To the extent that
the state was charged with the care of a destitute old person who could
no longer engage in subsistence work, public poorhouses and other
early social welfare measures were often the only alternative.293 These
options, however, were far from ideal, with many old people relegated
to poorhouses and left in poverty to expire alone.294
Employment pensions helped to address this problem, yet their
current market-based funding structure has led them to prey, however
inadvertently, on equally vulnerable individuals.295 In this regard, the
rise of pension fund investment in forms of marginalized debt is
remarkable because it reveals how the increasing privatization of
public welfare has pitted one vulnerable group against another.
Moreover, that workers are encouraged to accumulate wealth on the
backs of marginalized borrowers is symptomatic of the deeplyembedded notion of individualism that has guided much of welfare
retrenchment over the last several decades,296 which does not appear to
find much fault in this zero-sum approach to social provision. Instead,
the dictates of “personal responsibility, self-reliance, individual
discipline, [and] private probity” sanction a narrow vision of well-being
in which the ends justify the means.297

291. HACKER, DIVIDED, supra note 2, at 72.
292. Pension
v.
Poorhouse,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
28,
1927,
at
24,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1927/06/28/96657541.html?pageNumber=24
[https://perma.cc/V6SE-XYG9] (describing the poorhouse as the “cheerless refuge of the aged
left without friends or means of support and with no other fate to choose except what King Lear
preferred to the ungrateful daughter’s proffered shelter—To be a comrade with the wolf and
owl—Necessity’s sharp pinch”).
293. E.g., SKOCPOL, supra note 143, at 143. Skocpol describes the fate of “elderly paupers”
in 1915 Massachusetts by explaining that:
[They consisted of] 60 percent foreign born, even though the foreign born constituted
only 39.4 percent of all the Massachusetts elderly in 1915. Mostly these were elderly
men and women without families to help them. They did not qualify for either federal
or state aid to veterans, and thus had no choice but to fall back on the poorhouse or
outdoor relief.
Id.
294. Id.
295. See Soederberg, supra note 11 (arguing that “[c]annibalistic capitalism captures the
processes by which workers’ savings in the form of pension funds feed off both their own increased
indebtedness and that of other workers, a condition driven largely by stagnant real wages and
unemployment”).
296. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 155, at 53–56.
297. Id.
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By sending individual workers and pension funds alike into the
market to procure their own retirement security, the state has created
a new breed of capitalist, whose image is uncharacteristically more
closely aligned with the image of a sheep rather than that the
proverbial “swindler” wolf.298 These are not familiar caricatures of
Wall Street titans, smugly proclaiming that “greed . . . is good” for the
broader society.299 Nor are they the captains of industry that stand in as
stereotypes of mercenary labor exploitation in the era of industrial
production.300 Instead, the workers whose savings are pooled to create
the mammoth pension funds wielding billions of dollars are often
workers of modest means who act to secure a modest livelihood in their
old age.301 Their aim in high-risk institutional investment is, at the
individual level, modest and seemingly justified in light of the
retirement structure in which they exist.
Indeed, the identity of the ostensible beneficiaries here,
retirement-insecure workers, and the public purpose that underlies this
form of regressive investment, arguably shifts the balance in ways that
make the whole-sale denouncement of pension fund investment in
marginalized debt more difficult to countenance. It complicates the
story that high interest rate debt concentrated in marginalized
298. See WEBBER, supra note 9, at 8, 17; Martin Fridson, The Non-Original Wolf of Wall
Street, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2013, 5:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2013/12/26/thenon-original-wolf-of-wall-street [https://perma.cc/34WH-7AG4].
299. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). In this film, the main character Gordon Gekko,
(who represents the stereotype of a 1980s Wall Street financier and corporate raider) gives a wellknown monologue including an impassioned Hayekian speech expounding on the broader
benefits of the self-interested pursuit of profits. Gekko says:
In the last seven deals that I’ve been involved with, there were 2.5 million stockholders
who have made a pretax profit of 12 billion dollars. Thank you. I am not a destroyer of
companies. I am a liberator of them! The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed—
for lack of a better word—is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts
through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms –
greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge—has marked the upward surge of
mankind. And greed—you mark my words—will not only save [the fictional
corporation at issue in the film], but that other malfunctioning corporation called the
USA.
Id.
300. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 35, at 38–39 (observing how “fantasies about captains of
industry, unfettered by the state, leading the way to riches for everyone without regard for
ecological limits” are often represented as symbolic of capitalism); Chester McArthur Destler,
Entrepreneurial Leadership Among the “Robber Barons”: A Trial Balance, 6 J. ECON. HIST. 28,
28, 43 (1946) (describing the “robber barons” as “the semi-piratical entrepreneurs who roamed
the United States virtually unchecked before 1903, save for the opposition of a few publicists and
some short-lived vigilante committees” and noting their “[m]arked hostility to the labor
movement”).
301. See, e.g., Webber, supra note 11.
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communities is bad, when one considers its purported benefit to
retirement security as a pillar of the U.S. welfare project.
Moreover, when one considers who occupies the ranks of public
pensioners and the significance of a solvent pension fund to their
livelihood, there is even greater complexity. Teachers, police officers,
Department of Motor Vehicles workers, and other public servants
alike rely on their pensions to facilitate retiring in relative dignity and
comfort. In this light, there is also an equality valence to the balance of
things that complicates the critique of public pension fund reliance on
investment in marginalized debt. Civil service, public school teaching,
and police work, for example, are the sorts of occupations that were
traditionally available to Black Baby Boomers and women.302 As a
consequence, solvent and prosperous public pension funds are a
significant aspect of maintaining and improving the already-burdened
wealth of these groups. From this perspective, a robust, well-funded
public pension fund that can meet its retirement obligations has
important social and public significance.
From a consequentialist perspective, this significance perhaps
softens the rough edges of regressive wealth redistribution, particularly
in this context. As a normative matter, it might justify the practice,
though it seems to pit the interests of one vulnerable group against
those of another. In the language of Professor Barbara Fried, it is a
“tragic tradeoff” that is nevertheless properly subject to aggregative
considerations from a policy perspective.303
The question of net gains and losses is further complicated by the
likelihood that retirement-insecure workers and marginalized
borrowers are not entirely discrete groups. Instead, a single person
might find themselves situated on both ends of the retiree and
marginalized borrower divide. For example, online subprime lenders

302. See Russell W. Rumberger, The Job Market for College Graduates, 1960–90, 55 J.
HIGHER EDUC. 433, 440, 445–47 (1984); Joe L. Russell, Changing Patterns in Employment of
Nonwhite Workers, 89 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 503, 506 (1966); Robert Blythe, The Afro-American
Patrolmen’s League, CHI. HIST. MUSEUM: BLOG, https://www.chicagohistory.org/aapl
[https://perma.cc/93RG-ZVQ6]; see also Douglas A. Wolf & Anna A. Amirkhanyan,
Demographic Change and Its Public Sector Consequences, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. S12, S18–S19
(2010) (“Rapid growth of the public sector between the 1960s and mid-1970s resulted in a large
group of baby boomers employed in the public sector.”).
303. See Barbara H. Fried, Facing Up to Risk, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 175, 178–79 (2019)
(observing the “growing philosophical literature on harm to others [that] has been concerned
principally . . . with conduct that is . . . ‘intuitively permissible’ but potentially harmful to others”
and arguing that “in a world of indeterminate consequences, we cannot logically resolve the vast
majority of interpersonal conflicts in civil society without resort to aggregation”).
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like SafetyLend market their subprime loans directly to teachers. The
company’s online materials opine that:
Unsecured personal loans can help school teachers overcome
temporary cash needs without having to risk or refuse such necessary
things as a house, boat, car, life insurance, or investment account.
With such emergency loan you can also resist unexpected personal
problems with health or repairing as such trouble involve urgent
money need and cannot wait till paycheck.304

The perversity of pension fund wealth accumulation from marginalized
debt-power is perhaps most pernicious in this context, where the quest
for wealth accumulation is so decidedly circular.305 Yet, even if
retirement-insecure workers and marginalized borrowers are discrete
and separate groups, in the current financialized economy and self-help
welfare state, they must both depend heavily on high-priced risky debt
in order to secure their wellbeing. In the balance, however, one’s
marginalization underpins the other’s gain.
Ultimately, neither lending and borrowing nor the accumulation
of wealth through investment are inherently harmful.306 But further
empirical research is necessary to determine whether public pension
fund investment in marginalized debt is in fact a public good when
balanced against the well-documented harms that marginalized debt
and chronic indebtedness engender in the lives of marginalized
communities.307 CalPERS employs this consequentialist framing to
justify and tout the work that it does on behalf California’s public
employees. For example, in a promotional video posted on its website,
CalPERS touts the many benefits of its investment strategies, opening
with: “[W]e work hard to get the best risk-adjusted returns to secure
your retirement. . . . Overall, the benefits we pay generate economic
activity across the state[, h]elping to propel California’s economy to the
5th largest in the world.”308

304. Emergency Loans for Teachers, SAFETYLEND, https://www.safetylend.com/emergencyloans-for-teachers [https://perma.cc/4D4U-SQHK].
305. Accord Jacoby, supra note 91, at 34 (describing U.S. modern financial develop as, in
part, fomenting a “war of all against all”).
306. See, e.g., Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 1100 (observing that “credit and debt
often amplify the underlying set of circumstances into which they are introduced” and that “where
credit and its amplifying qualities are concerned, what is good gets better, and what is bad gets
worse”); King Sermon, supra note 38 (preaching that “wealth is amoral like any other force, such
as the force of electricity. It can be used for good or evil”).
307. See supra note 303.
308. CalPERS Video, supra note 14.
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IV. ON ADDRESSING MARGINALIZATION AS VALUE
Pension fund wealth extraction together with private equity
profiteering by investment in marginalized debt exemplify two distinct
problems. First, they undermine the notion that private interests can
serve the public welfare without significant regulation that seeks to
curb socially-harmful opportunism.309 Indeed, as a general matter, U.S.
social provision policy has “enshrine[d]” a largely market-based,
public-private welfare regime administered by private individuals and
entities, whose own guiding, efficiency-rooted principle is wealth
maximization without obligation or duty to consider the means by
which that end is achieved.310 By leaving the task of wealth
accumulation to private markets, including credit/debt markets, social
provision policy unjustifiably delegates issues of redistribution to a set
of actors for whom mere efficiency in wealth extraction is their
operative lodestar.311
For public pension funds, with their “fund-first” fiduciary duty to
the pot of money itself, and for private equity firms, with their similar
fiduciary duty to their investors and their own bottom lines, the
consequences of wealth extraction are largely irrelevant and thus
merely discretionary. Wealth comes first, regardless of its source,
leaving private financial intermediaries free to commodify the distress

309. See CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF
CAPITALISM passim (2014) (observing how private investment moved to the center of modern
monetary policies); see also Martha Minow, Seeing, Bearing, and Sharing Risk: Social Policy
Challenges for Our Time, in SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, SHARED RISK: GOVERNMENTS,
MARKETS, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 253 (Jacob S. Hacker & Ann
O’Leary eds., 2012) (observing that in the U.S. welfare regime, “the dominant rhetorical
framework obscures the real choices and stakes by using crude alternatives of private markets
and collective responsibility, with inadequate attention to the details that determine incentives
and reallocations”).
310. See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel
Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century
Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1791 (2020). The authors describe the “Twentieth-Century
Synthesis” in law that “has muted problems of distribution and power throughout public and
private law.” Id. They then posit that “[a]s a result, the economy has receded as a subject in fields
now reconstituted as fundamentally political, and politics has receded as a subject in fields
reconstituted as fundamentally economic.” Id.
311. Professor Zachary Liscow has christened this efficiency-focused approach as “onepieism,” which assumes that “there is a single economic pie consisting of perfectly commensurable
ingredients.” Zachary Liscow, Redistribution for Realists 8 (Feb. 24, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3792122 [https://perma.cc/
H2KU-CKJS]. Liscow explains that, “[t]he first aim of the ‘one-pieist’ approach is to maximize
the size of the pie,” and “[t]o maximize the size of the pie, traditional economic reasoning suggests
that policymakers focus on efficiency . . . [and] should not consider distributive implications.” Id.
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of others in service of wealth accumulation. Consequently, a set of
regulatory interventions that seek to disincentivize both financial
intermediaries and pension fund managers from commodifying
marginalization would work to reduce the harms engendered by
institutional investment in marginalized debt.
Second, the investment value of marginalized debt highlights
significant features of U.S. capitalism—namely the persistence of
socioeconomic marginalization as a source of wealth extraction and
accumulation, and the degree to which debt has become embedded in
our system of social provision as a means of survival and opportunity
for marginalized groups. With respect to this more complex issue, the
mere regulation of pension fund institutional investment in
marginalized debt, while harm reductive,312 would not do much to
address the sourcing of economic value in the debt-laden
socioeconomic distress of marginalized communities, including its
distributive implications. Thus, in addition to specific regulatory
interventions in pension fund and private equity institutional
investment, policymakers should increase their focus on the ways in
which the private profit motive undermines socioeconomic well-being.
A. Regulatory Reform and Harm Reduction
Pension fund wealth extraction and private equity profiteering
through marginalized debt investment warrant regulatory
intervention. For example, as pillars of social welfare, public pension
funds should have a more public-regarding mission that precludes
extractive, regressive wealth maximization investment policies. Thus,
one intervention might be to define public pension fund fiduciary duty
in such a way as to preclude this type of investment. Similarly, given
their practical significance in the solvency of an important pillar of U.S.
social welfare, private equity firms should be subject to greater
oversight and regulation of their internal processes.313 From a secondbest perspective, these reforms would be useful in mandating that

312. See MacCoun, supra note 37, at 95 (defining harm reduction as “making an
objectionable behavior safer”).
313. See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 51, at 73. The authors describe other ways in which
private equity firms, as general partners and managers, impose harms on other stakeholders like
employees of the target company for investment. Id. They observe that “a third source of private
equity gains is a transfer from workers to [private equity] investors when employees at healthy
companies are laid off [in order to increase profits] and those who remain are subjected to an
intensification of work.” Id.
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various financial intermediaries attend to the broader consequences of
their economic decisions.
1. Expanding the Fiduciary Duties of Public Pension Funds. Public
pension fund managers hold the retirement security of millions of
workers in their hands. In light of this tremendous responsibility,
fraught as it is with significant underfunding and political
consequences, it is unsurprising that public pension funds might find
“[private equity’s] high returns are too tempting to ignore.”314 Indeed,
because the public-private welfare regime has developed to force
investment as the main source of funding, pension funds seemingly
have no other options.315 This reality should not preclude investment
guidelines that limit broader social harm of certain investments.316
Specifically, one way to address this issue would be to incorporate such
limits into public pension funds’ fiduciary duties.
Public and private pension fund managers owe fiduciary duties of
prudence and loyalty only to participants in the plan.317 These duties
are largely predicated on common law trust doctrine, and “limit[]
[pension fund managers’] ability to direct the fund in ways that would
not serve the interests of the pension plan participants and their
beneficiaries.”318 Moreover, to the extent that a pension fund manager
appropriately satisfies their fiduciary duties upon electing to invest in
a fund that is managed by a private equity firm, the latter similarly owes
a fiduciary duty as general partner to the pension fund as limited
partner.319 The general partner’s fiduciary duty to its limited partners,
however, does not impose any responsibility to consider “externalities”

314. Jacoby, supra note 91, at 57.
315. See Beermann, supra note 11, at 15 (“[U]nfunded pension and retiree health care
liabilities are significant and, absent serious reform, will contribute to future fiscal problems.”).
316. But see Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 852 (1993) (arguing that “political pressure to support
local firms and engage in other forms of social investing places important limits on the
effectiveness of public fund activism in corporate governance”).
317. Webber, supra note 11, at 2122–23.
318. Rose, supra note 42, at 893. With respect to public pension funds, this duty is a creature
of state law, while ERISA generally governs private pensions. Id. at 897–903 (describing ERISA’s
duty of loyalty which “requires a fiduciary to discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to those participants and their beneficiaries, as well as defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan” and observing that it “functions as a participant wealth maximization
rule”).
319. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15904.08 (West 2021) (defining the “fiduciary duties [of
loyalty and care] that a general partner owes to the limited partnership”).
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stemming from the general partner’s investment decisions “so long as
[those decisions] do not negatively affect the returns of the fund’s
investments.”320 For this reason, Professor Paul Rose has argued that,
at least with respect to public pension whose liabilities are ultimately
borne by “taxpayers, current and future, as the [pension fund’s] true
residual claimants and guarantors,” the fiduciary duty should
encompass a “public wealth maximization model” that requires
managers to “consider all of the impacts of various investments—
including positive and negative externalities that would be borne by
the taxpayers—in determining how to invest.”321
Likewise, Webber has critiqued the “fund-first” posture of public
pension fund fiduciary duty, proposing instead a “member-first”
approach that would “properly prioritize the economic interests of plan
members in the making of investment decisions.”322 In this regard,
Webber has highlighted the tremendous power the public pension
funds could wield through their control of the vast sum that constitutes
labor’s capital. Pointing out that pension funds control over $5.6
trillion, Webber has argued that pension funds should deploy this
“transformative” power to prioritize workers’ interests.323 In other
words, the influence of labor’s capital in the market is a viable
alternative to the waning influence of labor unions in the fight for
workers’ rights, including retirement benefits.324 This “member-first”
approach to public pension fund trustee fiduciary duties would, for
example, preclude investment in private companies that seek to
displace public employees through privatization.325
A similar restriction on public pension fund trustees, rooted in
their fiduciary duty, might consider the broader societal harms
associated with their investment choices, including those associated

320. Rose, supra note 42, at 895; see also Webber, supra note 11, at 2161–68 (critiquing this
fund-first approach).
321. Rose, supra note 42, at 913.
322. Webber, supra note 11, at 2168; see also WEBBER, supra note 9, at 183 (“It is an errant
view of fiduciary duty that locks labor into using its investment power to undermine its worker
interests and overall economic interests.”).
323. WEBBER, supra note 9, at 9.
324. Id. at 96 (arguing that “public pension and labor union funds can be used to undercut
further assaults on the well-being of workers by some of the most powerful entities in society—
hedge funds and private equity funds”).
325. Webber, supra note 11, at 2174 (observing that “[b]oycott or divestment is one potential
approach to the problem of public pension funds investing in companies that compete with their
members for jobs.”).
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with marginalized debt.326 This approach is consistent with the tenets
of “stakeholder primacy,” a theory of corporate decision-making in
which corporate managers consider the interests of “a broad array of
people and groups impacted by a corporation’s activities, from
employees to the people living in the local community.”327 Stakeholder
primacy is in stark contrast to shareholder primacy, the “dominant
theory of corporate governance,” in which “corporations should, first
and foremost, make decisions that benefit shareholders.”328
Stakeholder primacy is a more outward-facing approach to corporate
management that expressly considers environmental, social, and
governance (“ESG”) implications of corporate decision-making.329
ESG decision-making is an approach that many corporations at
least nominally endorse, including at the request of their influential
institutional shareholders like pension funds.330 For example, the
Business Roundtable, a self-described “association of chief executive
officers of America’s leading companies working to promote a thriving
U.S. economy and expanded opportunity for all Americans through
326. See, e.g., Simon Deakin, The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might
Stop It?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 67, 73 (2008) (“The pension fund issue is a striking example
of a situation in which better or more carefully managed targeted regulation could help bring
about a reversal of the negative effects of financialization.”). But see WEBBER, supra note 9, at
37–38 (arguing that in light of solvency concerns, there has to be some limit on public pension
investment decisions that hinge entirely on “purely social or political considerations”).
327. Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing:
Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 724 (2003); see also Cathy
Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE *1, at *4
(“Non-owners and non-managers, including employees, suppliers, customers, community
members, and advocacy groups of various stripes, have argued that corporations ought to consider
non-owner and non-management views and interests in corporate decision-making.”).
328. Hwang & Nili, supra note 327, at *1.
329. Id. at *5; see also Karen Firestone, How Investors Have Reacted to the Business
Roundtable Statement, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/how-investorshave-reacted-to-the-business-roundtable-statement [https://perma.cc/5P5P-BDAR] (“The
concept [of ESG] arose in 2004 when U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan urged the world’s
leading financial institutions to consider ESG factors in their allocation of capital, which he
believed would ultimately benefit not just society and the environment, but also businesses.”).
330. See Hwang & Nili, supra note 327 (observing that “[p]owerful institutional investors—
public pension funds, activist hedge funds, and most recently the big mutual funds—have
consolidated shareholder power and pressured management to make changes at shareholders’
behest”); id. at *6–7 (noting “that pressure from shareholders has been the primary reason that
public companies have choose [sic] to adopt ESG-related policies”); see also Michal Barzuza,
Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Why Millennials Will Win Trump’s War on Socially
Responsible Investing, HILL (Oct. 27, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/522955why-millennials-will-win-trumps-war-on-socially-responsible-investing [https://perma.cc/8DDSC6JF] (suggesting that the Trump Administration’s anti-ESG posture would likely succumb to
increasingly-influential millennials’ ESG commitments).
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sound public policy,”331 issued a statement in August 2019 redefining
the purpose of a corporation.332 Signed by 181 CEOs, the statement
professed a “fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders,”
including to “support[] the communities in which we work,” and to
“respect the people in our communities and protect the environment
by embracing sustainable practices across our businesses.333
Similarly, financial intermediaries334 and institutional pension
fund-shareholders335 alike have embraced this notion of an expanded
commitment to sustainable investment embedded in the ESG
approach. For example, even Warburg Pincus, purveyor of investment
opportunities in subprime lenders Mariner Finance and Santander
Consumer USA, advertises that it “adopts best practices in responsible
investing and abides by Warburg Pincus’ internal ESG Policy and the
Guidelines for Responsible Investment as developed by the American
Investment Council, where Warburg Pincus is a member.”336
Moreover, there are a range of investment funds that cater to various
ESG concerns. Investors can “invest [their] values” by choosing funds
that reject, for example, investments in deforestation, fossil fuels,
gender inequality, civilian firearms, the prison industrial complex, and
tobacco.337
There is, however, a legal limit to ESG-sensitive investment that
prioritizes social values.338 The “equal value rule” promulgated by the

331. About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/UE8P-28DC].
332. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation To Promote ‘An Economy
That
Serves
All
Americans’,
BUS.
ROUNDTABLE
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporationto-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/YKS5-APUN].
333. Id.
334. For example, investment giant BlackRock has developed a sustainability mission
statement in which BlackRock “aspire[s] to be an industry leader in how we incorporate
sustainability into . . . our sustainable investment solutions offered to our clients.” BlackRock
Mission Statement on Sustainability, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/
literature/publication/blk-sustainability-mission-statement-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZLEX7H].
335. See Firestone, supra note 329 (noting that CalPERS “has begun mounting activist
campaigns in recent years to change public company policies, for example pushing Red Rock
Resorts last year to amend their governance practices or risk losing their vote in proxies”).
336. ESG at Warburg Pincus, WARBURG PINCUS, https://warburgpincus.com/responsibility
[https://perma.cc/MBJ5-H69D].
337. Invest Your Values, AS YOU SOW, https://www.asyousow.org/invest-your-values
[https://perma.cc/XA7C-HJEF].
338. As Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad have argued,
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DOL permits pension trustees to choose between investments on
noneconomic bases “as long as they are of equal value [i.e.,] they have
the same risk-return profile.”339 In other words, what matters most
relative to fiduciary duty is that the trustee “prioritize returns,”
relegating any other concerns, like whether the investment supports
gender inequality for example, to a subordinate position.340 Thus, it is
only when the funds’ fiscal interests converge with the preferred social
values and morals that investment guided by the latter is consistent
with pension trustee fiduciary duties.341 Consequently, while an ESG
approach might give pension fund trustees some purchase in
considering moral or social concerns, that discretion stops when those
concerns would negatively affect the fund’s bottom line.342
Nevertheless, the existing fund-first fiduciary duty may already
preclude investment in high-risk private equity ventures such as those
rooted in marginalized debt.343 For example, Professors Tim Jenkinson,
Miguel Sousa, and Rüdiger Stucke studied “fund cash flow, valuation[,]
and performance data for the entire current and historical portfolio of
761 private equity funds invested in by [CalPERS].”344 On the one
hand, the authors found “evidence of significant long-term smoothing
ESG is not a utopian, quixotic effort to turn altruism into profitmaking, but a business
strategy designed to protect shareholders from downside risk, which represents a
potential reversal of positive returns and decline in value. Viewed as shielding company
assets from negative impact, ESG has little trouble fitting squarely with shareholder
primacy.
Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1411
(2020).
339. WEBBER, supra note 9, at 98.
340. Id.
341. Accord Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (in the context of civil rights, pioneering the principle
of “interest-convergence,” in which “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites,” and positing that “the
fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective
racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle
and upper class whites”).
342. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 338, at 1426 (arguing that ESG approaches are
beneficial because they “identify risks that, though emanating from a social or moral core, can
lead the company into deep financial trouble, hurting its earnings and stock price performance”).
343. Alexis Leondis, Private Equity Isn’t What Retirement Savers Need, BLOOMBERG (June
12, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-06-12/private-equity-isnt-what-retirement-savers-need [https://perma.cc/48GC-96VD] (citing research that shows that
“the median private equity buyout fund has basically matched the stock market’s performance
since 2006” and consequently, “the future of private equity fund performance isn’t so rosy”).
344. Tim Jenkinson, Miguel Sousa & Rüdiger Stucke, How Fair Are the Valuations of
Private Equity Funds? 2 (Feb. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=2229547 [https://perma.cc/6HG6-NNR2].
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of returns over the life of the fund, consistent with conservative
valuation of portfolio companies.”345 On the other hand, the authors
observed “that valuations of remaining portfolio companies . . . are
inflated” during the fundraising period for follow-on funds, when the
fund is soliciting new investors.346
Moreover, “the performance figures reported by funds during
fundraising have little power to predict ultimate returns [which is]
especially true when performance is measured using internal rate of
return.”347 In other words, the authors suggest that managers can and
do manipulate their funds’ performance both to disguise significant
fluctuations in risk348 and, when raising capital from investors, can and
do manipulate the success of the predecessor funds in order to entice
capital investment for the follow-on fund. Consequently, the authors
warn that “investors should be extremely wary of basing investment
decisions on the returns of the current fund, especially when looking at
reported [internal rates of return.]”349
There is evidence, however, that both supports and contradicts
Jenkinson, Sousa, and Stucke’s observations. For example, consistent
with their analysis, one study of CalPERS’ performance over time
suggests that as its appetite for greater investment risk has grown, its
rates of return have steadily decreased,350 while another suggests that
most of the returns are eaten up by private equity firm fees.351 By
contrast, a recent study by the American Investment Council reports
that “[p]rivate equity delivers robust returns for public pension

345. Id.
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Olivier Le Marois & Raphael Douady, Return Smoothing Practices: A Potential
Threat for Alternative Investment Growth, HEDGE FUND J. (Sept. 2007),
https://thehedgefundjournal.com/return-smoothing-practices
[https://perma.cc/C5C9-DR2F]
(“The principal consequence of return smoothing seems to be that it apparently mitigates the
risks, when taking the naïve view of an investor based on performance indicators . . . .”).
349. Jenkinson, Sousa & Stucke, supra note 344, at 3.
350. Estes & Kremling, supra note 30, at 83; see also Lauren Coleman-Lochner & Eliza
Ronalds-Hannon, Everything Is Private Equity Now, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-10-03/how-private-equity-works-and-tookover-everything [https://perma.cc/ZJ9F-D6SY] (last updated Oct. 8, 2019, 4:10 PM) (observing
that private equity firms have expanded power to “game” their returns).
351. Indeed, by one account: “Private equity funds tend to charge an annual management fee
of 2% and a performance fee of 20%. Added to the generally higher fees already paid for target
date funds, the returns will really have to be supersized to justify the cost of the alternative
investments.” Leondis, supra note 343; accord WEBBER, supra note 9, at 81 (observing that
“[h]edge funds are very often a bad investment for everyone except hedge fund managers”).
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beneficiaries” and “outperform[s] other asset classes” including public
equity, real estate[,] and fixed income assets.352
As Rose suggests, then, it may be the case that “fiduciary duties
alone are much too slender a support to carry the governance load of
a public fund, particularly in the context of public funds that carry
political risks.”353 Indeed, given that public pension funds—although
deeply influenced by ERISA—are creatures of state law, states could
override traditional notions of fiduciary duties by legislatively
prohibiting certain investments that are socially or morally harmful.
This approach, however, is fraught with political risk relative to the
ultimate burden and liability borne by taxpayers.354 Pension funds that
cannot meet their obligations must turn to the taxpayers, making social
investment that reduces the funds’ solvency a politically impractical
venture.
2. Regulating Private Equity Funds. Similarly, as managers of
public wealth, private equity firms and other financial intermediaries
could be better regulated to mandate that they deploy their expertise
in a manner that is beneficial to the public interest.355 Indeed,
notwithstanding private equity’s significance to social welfare, their
investment choices appear minimally constrained by concerns for the
overall public welfare. For example, when confronted with the reality
of Mariner Finance’s predatory behavior in its sale of subprime loans,
Warburg Pincus officials, including Former U.S. Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner, apparently declined to comment.356 Instead, the
private investment firm’s spokesperson responded by suggesting that
Mariner Finance was providing “a valuable service to hundreds of
thousands of Americans who have limited access to consumer

352. AM. INV. COUNCIL, COUNCIL, PRIVATE EQUITY DELIVERS THE STRONGEST RETURNS
RETIREES ACROSS AMERICA: 2021 PUBLIC PENSION STUDY 4 (2021), https://
www.investmentcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021_pension_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FGJM7JS].
353. Rose, supra note 42, at 922.
354. E.g., Romano, supra note 316, at 796 (“Public fund managers must navigate carefully
around the shoals of considerable political pressure to temper investment policies with local
considerations, such as fostering in-state employment, which are not aimed at maximizing the
value of their portfolios’ assets.”).
355. See Gelter, supra note 199, at 952 (“The changes in the private pension landscape have
also had the effect of channeling the political power of shareholder value through the pension
system, thus increasing the significance of the financial industry, both on the level of individual
firms where pension wealth is invested and on the political level.”).
356. Whoriskey, supra note 22.
FOR
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credit.”357 Profit-motivated financial intermediaries like Warburg
Pincus, however, should not be the arbiters of what industries have
public value, particularly when they are functioning as a significant
aspect of the social welfare system.
Thus, one place to begin would be to address the relative lack of
transparency requirements imposed on private equity firms to disclose
the relevant inner workings of their funds, especially those that are
largely capitalized by labor’s capital.358 Currently, private equity funds
are subject to relatively minimal oversight. For example, they largely
escape the mandated disclosures that have been an important feature
of U.S. securities law since the Great Depression.359 On the heels of the
1929 stock market crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
(“the 1933 Act”) which mandated registration of any public offering of
securities with the newly-constituted Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).360 In order to promote “truth in securities law,”
the 1933 Act’s aim was to “require that investors receive financial and
other significant information concerning securities being offered for
public sale,” and “to prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other
fraud in the sale of securities.”361 Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act,
however, creates a “safe harbor” for certain private offerings by
excluding them from various mandatory disclosure requirements.362
Moreover, under Rule 506 of Regulation D, the exemption permits
private equity to sell shares in their funds without any mandatory
disclosures provided that their potential investors are limited to
“accredited investors,”—individuals and firms (including pension
funds) that exceed specified wealth limits.363 In other words, private

357. Id.
358. See WEBBER, supra note 9, at 159 (observing that “when operating away from the
sunshine, private equity funds were cheating on their fees and expense allocations ‘over 50% of
the time’” (quoting Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., Off. of Compliance Inspections & Examinations,
Spreading Sunshine in Private Equity (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014—
spch05062014ab.html [https://perma.cc/SY6S-AQCP])).
359. Coleman-Lochner & Ronalds-Hannon, supra note 350 (observing that “[o]ne of [private
equity]’s superpowers is that it’s hard for outsiders to see and understand the industry”).
360. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. The SEC was authorized by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
361. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry,
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec/lawsgovern-securities-industry [https://perma.cc/T3CD-BMXU].
362. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
363. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2020); Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming
the System of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 245–46 (2005).
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equity firms may sell shares in their funds to as many accredited
investors as they’d like, without SEC oversight.
As pooled investment vehicles, private equity funds are also
formally subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“the 1940
Act”), but they also escape SEC oversight under a similar exemption
from the Act. As described by the SEC, the 1940 Act mandates that
companies who invest, reinvest, and otherwise trade in securities (such
as private equity funds) must “disclos[e] to the investing public of
information about the fund and its investment objectives, as well as on
investment company structure and operations.”364 However, under
Section 3(c)(1), funds that have no more than one hundred accredited
investors are exempt from this requirement, and under Section 3(c)(7),
funds that sell only to “qualified purchasers”—which includes most
pension funds—are likewise exempt.365
Until the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010, private equity
firms could similarly avoid SEC disclosures under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“the Advisers Act”).366 The Advisers Act’s goal
was “to protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of
unscrupulous tipsters and touts and to safeguard the honest investment
adviser against the stigma of the activities of these individuals by
making fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful.”367
Initially, investment advisers to private funds were largely excluded
from registration, but Dodd-Frank narrowed the exemption to apply
only to venture capital funds and other private funds (i.e., those relying
on Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act) having less than $150
million in assets under management.368 These “exempt reporting”
advisers are, however, required to file an annual report with the SEC
and are subject to SEC inspection.369 This change now means that
advisers to hedge funds and private equity funds are subject to the
Advisers Act once they have at least $150 million in assets under
management.

364. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 361.
365. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)1–80a-3(c)7; see also WEBBER, supra note 9, at 84 (describing the
relevant 1996 amendments to the 1940 Act).
366. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3, amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
367. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 28 (1940).
368. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1).
369. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(2); see also WEBBER, supra note 9, at 155–58 (describing the run
up to the passage of the registration requirement).
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Currently, increased regulation of private equity has risen to the
top of the legislative agendas of several members of Congress. In 2019,
several members of Congress, including Senators Elizabeth Warren,
Tammy Baldwin, and Sherrod Brown, and Representatives Mark
Pocan and Pramila Jayapal, first introduced the Stop Wall Street
Looting Act to more closely regulate private equity funds.370
Reintroduced in October 2021, the legislation proposes to impose
several new requirements on private equity funds. For example, the bill
calls for private equity firms-as-fund-managers to maintain liability for
the debt they cause their target companies to take on,371 and it would
amend the 1940 Act to require private equity firms to disclose
increased financial information about their funds, including, “[a] list of
each entity with respect to which the fund owns an equity interest.”372
There has been significant opposition to increased regulation of
private equity. For example, one congressional opponent of the
proposed legislation has categorized it as “a danger to free society” and
as “nothing more than [a] central planning scheme[] that [will]
accumulate power in the government at the expense of the people.”373
Yet, a democratically-elected government is a legitimate locus for the
accumulation of power and social welfare decision-making, unlike the
C-Suite of a major private equity fund.374 The latter can justify their
investment in predatory for-profit schools or high-interest-rate, smalldollar lenders in the name of wealth maximization because their legal
obligation requires them to consider the fiscal value of their
investments, irrespective of the social consequence. In the retirement
security context, private equity firms are free to take from the

370. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., Warren, Baldwin, Brown, Pocan, Jayapal,
Colleagues Unveil Bold Legislation to Fundamentally Reform the Private Equity Industry (July
18, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-baldwin-brownpocan-jayapal-colleagues-unveil-bold-legislation-to-fundamentally-reform-the-private-equityindustry [https://perma.cc/B7WT-R3WS]. The 2019 Act died in committee and the group
reintroduced the Act in October 2021. Stop Wall Street Looting Act, S. 3022, 117th Cong. (2021);
Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., Warren, Baldwin, Brown, Pocan, Jayapal, Colleagues
Reintroduce Bold Legislation to Fundamentally Reform the Private Equity Industry (Oct. 20,
2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-baldwin-brown-pocanjayapal-colleagues-reintroduce-bold-legislation-to-fundamentally-reform-the-private-equityindustry [https://perma.cc/5KFK-T9YB].
371. Stop Wall Street Looting Act 2021 Press Release, supra note 370.
372. S. 3022.
373. 165 Cong. Rec. H10,007 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2019) (statement of Rep. Garland Barr).
374. See Bryan & Rafferty, supra note 262, at 79, 88 (“It turns out that, as owner, labor’s
capital has behaved pretty much like capital’s capital.”).
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vulnerable to give to the vulnerable, lending a patina of legitimacy to
their opportunism.375
B. On Marginalization, Debt, and Value
The regulatory reforms described in the preceding section, while
intended to be harm-reductive, would nevertheless merely play at the
edges of the deeper structural issues implicated by the incidence of
marginalized debt as regressive redistribution in investment-based
retirement security.376 Namely, notwithstanding that equality has
nominally characterized the U.S. project, the U.S.’s capitalist society
has always sourced and extracted value from marginalization.
Moreover, the embeddedness of consumer debt, and specifically
marginalized consumer debt, in our current financialized economy
perpetuates this phenomenon.
1. On the Historical Value of Marginalization. Historical accounts
show that the commodification of marginalized experiences has been
central to wealth maximization in the development of U.S. capitalism.
Indeed, these accounts bear a striking resemblance in kind to the
conundrum of marginalized debt expressed here in which
marginalization is a valuable commodity. For example, historian Eric
Williams was among the first to describe the primacy of wealth
maximization in the development of African slavery in New World
capitalism, including in the southern U.S. colonies.377 Williams
observed that the enslavement of Africans was primarily “economic,
not racial.”378 Instead, racism developed to serve the economic interests
of mass agricultural production. The maximization of wealth thus
engendered the subsequent social subordination of AfricanAmericans, and the reproduction of that subordination, including the
development of racism, was necessary in order to continue to serve the
economic interest. Thus, Williams observed:

375. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 35, at 53.
376. Cf. MacCoun, supra note 37, at 84 (describing debates about harm reduction as a policy
approach and observing that “advocates argue that pragmatic steps to reduce the harmful
consequences of a risky behavior will save lives and reduce needless suffering, while opponents
counter that these steps might ‘send the wrong message’—encouraging or enabling the behavior
and weakening society’s moral stigma against it”).
377. See ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY, at ix (1944) (discussing “the
relationship between early capitalism as exemplified by Great Britain, and the Negro slave trade,
Negro slavery[,] and the general colonial trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”).
378. Id. at 19.
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The features of the man, his hair, color and dentifrice, his
“subhuman” characteristics so widely pleaded, were only the later
rationalizations to justify a simple economic fact: that the colonies
needed labor and resorted to Negro labor because it was cheapest and
best. This was not a theory, it was a practical conclusion deduced from
the personal experience of the planter. He would have gone to the
moon, if necessary, for labor. Africa was nearer than the moon, nearer
too than the more populous countries of India and China. But their
turn was to come.379

Similarly, historian Bonnie Martin argues that the continued
subordination of enslaved Africans was “central to the expansion of
[early] local and regional [U.S.] economies.”380 For example, Martin
observes that by the early eighteenth century, “British colonists in
South Carolina were using slaves they already owned to attract lenders
and the cash and credit they needed to buy more land and slaves—
capital they needed for economic expansion.”381 Moreover, rich
planters and poor speculators alike sought to raise their own economic
status by exploiting the marginalization of others by “work[ing] their
slaves to generate cash and credit where both were scarce.”382 These
transactions, in turn, “represented a small burst of capital injected into
local and regional economies” that, when considered together with
other similar enslaved person-backed credit transactions, “became
significant enough to accelerate economic growth.”383
This practice of commodifying marginalization helped to fuel the
development of U.S. capitalism in the nineteenth century. For
example, one historian describes the Consolidated Association of the
Planters of Louisiana (“C.A.P.L.”), an organization developed in the
early nineteenth century to facilitate greater liquidity in U.S. slavebased agriculture while reducing the risk of financial loss to investors.384
The aspiring planters and speculators’ had a high risk of failure in
significant part because “[t]hey depended on the bodies and the lives
of people whom they also brutally exploited, beginning with their

379. Id. at 20.
380. Bonnie Martin, Slavery’s Invisible Engine: Mortgaging Human Property, 76 J.S. HIST.
817, 818–20 (2010).
381. Id. at 828.
382. Id. at 825.
383. Id.
384. Edward Baptist, Toxic Debt, Liar Loans, and Securitized Human Beings: The Panic of
1837 and the Fate of Slavery, COMMONPLACE (Apr. 2010), http://commonplace.online/
article/toxic-debt-liar-loans [https://perma.cc/WBN9-A8YP].
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forced migration to a deadly environment. The cotton country of the
Mississippi Valley was hot and wet, and the people transported there
died of fevers in great number.”385 Thus by one account:
For everyone who drew profit in the system, enslaved human beings
were the ultimate hedge. Cotton merchants, bankers, slave traders—
everybody whose money the planter borrowed and could not pay
until the time the cotton was sold at a high enough price to pay off his
or her debts—all could expect that eventually enslaved people would
either 1) make enough cotton to enable the planter to get clear or 2)
be sold in order to generate the liquidity to pay off the debt.386

To mitigate the high risk of loss that investors faced, some
enslavers developed a means of securitizing their human collateral. For
example, C.A.P.L. created a bond system in which planters in need of
liquidity “mortgaged slaves and cultivated land to the C.A.P.L., which
entitled them to borrow up to half of the assessed value of their
property from the C.A.P.L[.]”387 C.A.P.L. then “convinced the
Louisiana legislature to back $2.5 million in bank bonds” backed by
the “‘faith and credit’ of the people of the state.”388 Because the risk of
loss was spread across the ventures of several planters, “the bonds
created a pool of high-quality credit . . . at a rate significantly lower
than the rate of return that [planters] could expect that money to
produce,” in turn “allow[ing] a much wider group of people to profit
from the opportunities of slavery’s expansion.”389
Historian Caitlin Rosenthal’s study of the accounting
methodology of slaveholders confirms this commitment to the
commodification of marginalization in the development of U.S.
capitalism.390 Rosenthal shows how slaveowners and planters
developed scientific management techniques engendered by
“frequently experimenting with new methods for maximizing
output.”391 Rosenthal documents how planters used “sophisticated
accounting techniques” to increase production and profits, recording
in “neat columns of numbers” how their manipulation of the lives they

385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. CAITLIN ROSENTHAL, ACCOUNTING FOR SLAVERY: MASTERS AND MANAGEMENT 4
(2018) (observing that “plantation records can tell us about the history of capitalism”).
391. Id. at 85.
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enslaved positively or negatively affected the bottom line.392
Consequently, she observes that “[s]laveholders’ calculations show
that they were keenly aware of human processes on profits and losses,
and they attempted to manipulate enslaved lives to increase their
earnings.”393 Moreover, “planters[] [made] efforts to quantify output”
and “efforts to estimate and maximize the value of the men and women
themselves.”394
2. On the Continued Value of Marginalization. In a modern
account of the same phenomenon, Professor Keeanga-Yamahta Taylor
has described the phenomenon of “predatory inclusion” in the late
twentieth century credit-based housing market. Defining predatory
inclusion as “how African American homebuyers were granted access
to conventional real estate practices and mortgage financing, but on
more expensive and comparatively unequal terms[,]”395 Taylor shows
how the exclusion of African Americans from access to Great
Depression-Era and midcentury, federally-subsidized mortgages
resulted in a rich source of profit for banks and mortgage brokers in
the 1970s willing to lend to this marginalized community.396
Socioeconomic exclusion, coupled with a renewed federal policy of
promoting homeownership in the economically-depressed inner cities,
provided a breeding ground for speculators looking to capitalize on a
new source of investment wealth. Thus, by commodifying the
marginalization of hopeful Black homeowners in the immediate postCivil Rights Era, spectators were able to extract value from these
already vulnerable communities and spaces by charging higher interest
rates and extending more burdensome terms.
The instrumental value of marginalized debt in retirement wealth
maximization is evidence that even though indebtedness is now a
channel for redistribution rather than enslavement, marginalization
remains a valuable state of being. Just as in historical accounts of how
the bottom-line-first orientation of antebellum investments justified
securitized slave bonds as a tool to maximize investor wealth (despite

392. Id. at 86.
393. Id. at 121–22.
394. Id. at 122. Based on this research, Rosenthal ultimately concludes that, “[i]nequality can
drive innovation, and innovation can entrench inequality, particularly in highly unregulated labor
markets that put everything—even lives—up for sale.” Id. at 192.
395. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL
ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 5 (2019).
396. Id. at 4.
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the underlying social consequences), private equity firms in the present
can similarly justify their investment in predatory for-profit schools or
high-interest-rate, small-dollar lenders in the name of wealth
maximization because their duty lies with the money, not the people
affected by the money. Moreover, because at least in the pension
context, these financial intermediaries are taking from the vulnerable
to give to the vulnerable, their approach reflects a patina of
legitimacy.397
At a minimum, pension funds’ reliance on marginalized debt to
promote retirement security raises broader normative concerns
regarding entrenched regressivity in wealth redistribution and wealth
accumulation. Indeed, those who tend to occupy the economic
“sacrifice zone[s]”398 are predictably marginalized across a range of
measures.399 They have to rely on debt for survival and for opportunity
in the current welfare regime,400 and they exist in a structure that both
emphasizes and supports their use of credit/debt to mitigate
socioeconomic inequality and foster socioeconomic mobility.401 The
reality is that there is profit to be made from this combination of
marginalization and the market. Thus, even if not to benefit social
provision, private equity and other institutional investors will continue
to extract wealth from the marginalization of others.402 It is this larger
part of the structure that requires our sustained focus and effort if we
are seriously interested in improved socioeconomic equality.

397. See Harris, supra note 35, at 53.
398. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Racism, American Exceptionalism, and Cold
War Human Rights, 26 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 300, 314 (2017) (discussing,
from an environmental justice perspective, the “national and state patterns, whereby hazardous
industrial facilities operate in close proximity to communities predominantly populated by people
of color”).
399. Cf. Fried, supra note 303, at 196 (arguing that because we live “in a world of uncertain
consequences, [in which] any rule of conduct we adopt imposes tradeoffs among competing and
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CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of public pension fund investment in
marginalized debt reveals how the retirement security of millions of
U.S. retirees lies in the hands of a relatively few financial
intermediaries who are increasingly relying on debt as a means of
regressive wealth extraction. The fund-first focus that private equity
funds embrace is not aligned with the broader public mission that
pension plans are supposed to reflect, nor is it consistent with a robust
sense of accountability for the externalities that private equity
investment in alternative assets, like marginalized debt, may impose.
In this regard, the socioeconomic well-being of the most marginalized
communities and other ordinary individuals in the U.S. is subordinate
to profits, and debt is a significant channel of this form of
redistribution. This market-based, debt-funded social provision should
cause policymakers to look more deeply and closely to assess the
operation and optimality of consumer credit/debt, particularly its
interaction with its professed aspiration of increasing socioeconomic
equality.

